Saturday, August 07, 2010

Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, pt.2

In my previous post I claimed that the topic of the second part of the "Discourse" was the emergence of society from the state of nature. Re-reading it, however, I find Rousseau to be decidedly vague on the emergence of society. It has something to do with the geographical spread of the race, the development of technologies, and the emergence of property. If you can reconstruct a succinct argument, please do share. The real focus of this section, as I now see it, is the transformative effects of civilization on "savage man."

As with Hobbes and Locke, property takes center-stage in Rousseau's treatment. It affords him this opening: "The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say 'this is mine' and found people simply enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society" (302). So his attitude toward this development--property as a sort of ruse on the simple-minded--we can see, is markedly different than his predecessors'. A bit later he writes, "in short, competition and rivalry on the one hand, opposition of interest[s] on the other, and always the hidden desire to profit at the expense of someone else[:... a]ll these ills are the first effect of property and inseparable offshoot of incipient inequality" (309). So what Hobbes, certainly, and Locke to a lesser extent, invoke society to remedy, Rousseau accuses it of introducing.

Society introduces the vice of inauthenticity. People become unduly interested in public esteem (305). How we appear to others becomes crucial to our own self-assessment, and this leads to vanity, contempt, envy, and shame. Furthermore, provided with leisure time, people develop a taste for new "conveniences," so that "being deprived of them became much more cruel than possessing them was sweet, and they were unhappy about losing them without being happy about possessing them" (305)--a criticism of consumer culture as relevant as ever today.

So there are two issues on the table: why do some people claim property, and why do others accept their claims? As Rousseau would have it, the poor are essentially duped by the wealthy. The poor lack resources to protect what little they possess, and so they readily agree to property regulations proposed by the rich, effectively legitimizing inequitable distribution (310). Hence the natural inequality that allows some men to work more efficiently than others is transformed into political inequality. And this is passed along through generations via inheritance so that this inequity becomes disassociated even from one's natural productive capacities.


This summary might not be comprehensive, but I hope I've hit the main points. Looking forward to your treatment of the "Social Compact"--

Cheers,
PJ

6 comments:

A Wiser Man Than I said...

Re-reading it, however, I find Rousseau to be decidedly vague on the emergence of society.

I agree. I think the key sentence is this: "Bus as soon as one man needed the help of another, as soon as one man realized that it was useful to for a single individual to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, property came into existence, labor became necessary." (p. 307)

I get easily frustrated with Rousseau. He seems to argue along these lines. First, find an obvious defect in present society. Second, imagine primitive man. Third, operating on the assumption that "the soul and human passions [have been] imperceptibly altered" (p. 312), find the point at which this occurred. But the argument assumes its conclusion by insisting that there is, in fact, a fundamental difference in human nature between primitive man and civilized man. He hasn't demonstrated this, at least to my satisfaction.

I can give an example. He asserts that there was nothing beyond an animal bond between primitive man and woman. (p. 302) Later, he explains that the bond arose when
man, woman and child shared a "common habitation." (p. 304) Yet if man has the nature Rousseau asserts first, he never would have lived with his children. And if he has a different nature, we need to then determine how that nature came about, which he does not answer.

The argument with property is similar. Primitive man has no need for property--according to Rousseau, anyway. But it is illogical to argue that the establishment of the right to property is what makes the change in man. Clearly, by then, the change has already come to pass. We have missed it.

I'd be curious to know if you find my criticism of Rousseau to be sound, or if I'm letting my dislike of romanticism get in the way of clear thinking.

Furthermore, provided with leisure time, people develop a taste for new "conveniences," so that "being deprived of them became much more cruel than possessing them was sweet, and they were unhappy about losing them without being happy about possessing them" (305)--a criticism of consumer culture as relevant as ever today.

And yet we can see why Voltaire was so frustrated with Rousseau. The leisure and luxury of the court were dear to Voltaire and his friends. It is true that people use leisure immoderately, and Rousseau does well to point this out. But it can also be used well.

This summary might not be comprehensive, but I hope I've hit the main points.

You did very well.

PJ said...

Eric: I think the key sentence [on the emergence of society] is this: "But as soon as one man needed the help of another, as soon as one man realized that it was useful to for a single individual to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, property came into existence, labor became necessary." (p. 307)

PJ: Yes, it has something to do with committing oneself to cooperative ventures and so developing relations of co-dependence. He doesn't offer a lot of detail (how could he?), but the basic idea strikes me as highly plausible.

Eric: [T]he argument assumes its conclusion by insisting that there is, in fact, a fundamental difference in human nature between primitive man and civilized man. He hasn't demonstrated this, at least to my satisfaction.

PJ: I think the basic claim is correct: society with all of its culture (the arts and sciences), its technologies, its history, its institutions (e.g., language, morality) transforms us into very different kinds of beings than our mere biology could ever achieve isolated in even the most bountiful natural environment. Does this formulation make the assumption seem any more palatable to you? Where I think the account is vulnerable is in the details of Rousseau's description of our natural state and the way that his idealized account seems to furnish normative standards by which to criticize society as a force of corruption and inauthenticity. (I think to Tolstoy's heroes, Pierre and Levin, spokesmen for the author's own moral condemnation of modern society.)

Eric: Yet if man has the nature Rousseau asserts first, he never would have lived with his children. And if he has a different nature, we need to then determine how that nature came about, which he does not answer.

PJ: If he fell into some cooperative venture, say primitive agriculture, that could very well keep him sedentary with a woman and their children.

Eric: The argument with property is similar. Primitive man has no need for property--according to Rousseau, anyway. But it is illogical to argue that the establishment of the right to property is what makes the change in man. Clearly, by then, the change has already come to pass. We have missed it.

PJ: He seems to endorse a Lockean account of property (see p. 308). Yet, what he insists, in opposition to Locke, is that by the time we have occasion to make property claims, that this is mine and not yours because I put my work into it, we have already left the state of nature and are living in some primitive form of civil society. Property is a social institution, not a natural right.

Eric: I'd be curious to know if you find my criticism of Rousseau to be sound, or if I'm letting my dislike of romanticism get in the way of clear thinking.

PJ: I too object to the more romantic strains of his argument -- and we should try to articulate these objections more precisely -- but, as I state above, I think the argument that you single out for criticize is sound in outline, if not in all of its detail.

PJ said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
PJ said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
A Wiser Man Than I said...

Does this formulation make the assumption seem any more palatable to you?

Undoubtedly, civilization changes man, but I don't think it's the fundamental change Rousseau claims. I think St. Augustine is correct in seeing all men as fallen. We may also do much good, and civilization no doubt helps us to this end, but there is a heart of darkness within us all.

If he fell into some cooperative venture, say primitive agriculture, that could very well keep him sedentary with a woman and their children.

I think it very well might, but my point is that the action only reveals the condition of man. It answers nothing to say man acts thus, therefore he is so. We need to know why he was capable of acting thus. The act may be proof of the change; it cannot be the cause of change itself.

PJ said...

Eric: Undoubtedly, civilization changes man, but I don't think it's the fundamental change Rousseau claims. I think St. Augustine is correct in seeing all men as fallen. We may also do much good, and civilization no doubt helps
us to this end, but there is a heart of darkness within us all.

PJ: I think you have a good point, which I would peg on Freud rather than Augustine (but whatever): we can never escape our basic, biological make-up. We remain always subject to preconscious drives and impulses, which we at best sublimate in the cultural realm. Nevertheless, I do believe that socialization and culture introduce a qualitative change in our make-up, introducing a new domain of normative institutions and spiritual satisfactions.

Eric: I think it very well might, but my point is that the action only reveals the condition of man. It answers nothing to say man acts thus, therefore he is so. We need to know why he was capable of acting thus. The act may be proof of the change; it cannot be the cause of change itself.

PJ: You want to know what makes men capable of cooperation? All I can offer is that we have the ability to recognize shared interests and postpone gratification in view of a greater pay-off in the future. And we're not the only animals so capable. What sort of explanation are you looking for?