On Liberty: Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion

This is part two of our five-part series on John Stuart Mill's essay in political philosophy, _On Liberty_. Just to remind anyone who hasn't followed all of the previous comments, the text is in the public domain and freely available on online; regularly assigned in survey courses, it is also easy to find used copies. Let me add that Mill has a highly discursive and wonderfully readable style. The essay is a pleasure to read, and anyone with an interest in political philosophy should be at least acquainted with the arguments presented therein.

I should also mention, because I don't know how this post will be formated, that it is PJ writing, not the blog owner, Eric. We're alternating summary pieces on Mill's essay. That he would so graciously invite me -- an atheist with communitarian sympathies -- to contribute to his Catholic-libertarian themed blog suggests that we're already in substantial agreement about the subject matter of this chapter of Mill's little treatise: the liberty of thought and discussion. Millsian plaudits to you, Eric!


So, to begin: The second chapter of _On Liberty_ is essentially a defense of free speech in the form of an argument for the advantages of "a free marketplace of ideas."

Human beings, Mill observes, are lulled into taking for granted the truth of a great body of opinion handed down to them and reenforced by socialization in its many, diverse forms. Much of what appears to us as unquestionably self-evident is, in fact, the result of peculiar historical contingencies, and appears quite strange and false to others outside of our cultural purview. Yet Mill has no especial interest in epistemology per se. He immediately proceeds to acknowledge that we should not -- indeed, cannot -- cease all activity, merely out of concern to avoid unfounded knowledge-claims: "If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed."

What Mill is concerned to establish are the advantages of the public scrutiny of opinions: "There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation." (Mill is eminently quotable, so decisive and succinct; I'll restrain myself as best I can.) There is no special mark of truth, shining forth with an irrefutable radience; yet, Mill is optimistic that open debate does more to expose the truth than conceal it. So long as we are forced to defend our beliefs with reasons, we cannot substitute our inner certainty -- the shear obviousness that so many of our beliefs have for us -- in place of actual evidence in favor of their objective (or intersubjective) validity.

As a separate, but related point, Mill goes on to add that most opinions are neither entirely true nor entirely false, and that partial truths are corrected equally well by public debate.

Another, more interesting (and perhaps contentious) set of claims, concern the *intrinsic* value of public debate. Whereas the opening claims attempt to establish public debate as the most effective *means* of arriving at the truth, Mill now turns to argue that this same debate actually contributes to the *value* of said truth. By being reminded always of competing opinions, and thus having to continually expound on the practical and epistemological merits of our own position, we maintain a more "lively apprehension" of the truth than we would otherwise be able. In fact, there is a sense in which we *do not know* the full truth of our doctrines unless we *understand why* they, rather than some alternatives, are true. Furthermore, and relatedly, to allow a truth to quietly sediment into the body of received opinion is to deprive the doctrine of "its vital effect on character and conduct"; we can no longer delight in the truth of that which we thoughtlessly take for granted.


In the interest of getting this posted more expeditiously than is my usual wont, I'll refrain from further commentary for the time being and just leave it at the summary.

I look forward to everyone's comments --

Cheers, PJ

On Liberty: Introductory

After a number of posts on the subject of ethics, along with vaguely related topics, PJ suggested we read On Liberty by J. S. Mill. After agreeing, I proposed a format in which we will alternate posts on the five sections of the book. The idea is less to convey the central tenants of essay than to discuss the applications thereof. Should anyone wish to join in, the irony would be too heavy to allow us to do otherwise than to allow it. Here goes:

Mill cuts to the heart of the matter starting with line 442:

This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

A libertarian would find little in these lines to which he would find reason to object. Nor, I think, would most people, of whatever ideological bent, object to these point--at least in the abstract. Mill is careful to exclude children--he speaks "of full age"--but otherwise asserts a threefold liberty, checked by what strikes one as quite reasonable bounds, the most important of these bounds being that which precludes us from causing harm in the exercise of our liberty of pursuit.

Again, I don't think that this is much to object to, but only in the abstract. Mill admits as much:

Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice.

Thus it is worth considering why the mass of men prefers to use compulsion to prevent people from engaging in perfectly legitimate freedoms. To take but one example, which seems prescient given the passing of George Carlin, there are certain words one is not allowed to use on television. The FCC, an arm of the federal government, enacts fines for the use of any of a number of "dirty words". Similarly, there was the infamous wardrobe malfunction in which a female breast--the horror!--was exposed for the world to see during the Super Bowl--and which will forever be available on the Internet.

These exceptions, though minor, are the kind of thing that most people will tolerate, even while considering that such toleration is in no ways incompatible with the full support of liberty. The ostensible reason for such intolerance is usually "the children", but even reasonable adults without children might very well object to, say, the airing of hardcore pornography on daylight television--or on roadside billboards.

The reason for the toleration of such exceptions is, I think, twofold. First, people will argue for a mitigation of what they believe to be inessential liberties because they don't see how these violations could ever cause them to forfeit the liberties they view to be essential. Preventing Leno from dropping F-bombs is acceptable because it can in no way prevent people from discussing the candidates running for election. People will even go so far as to insist that the suspension of habeas corpus for enemy combatants in our Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism will never lead to a similar suspension of rights for citizens--despite the fact that this has happened a number of times in U.S. history.

Second, a lamentably large number of people, though convinced of the truth they possess, are less confident in the ability for others to arrive at this truth without resorting to compulsion. There are many examples of this. The terrorists do not have legitimate concerns: "they hate our freedoms". Religious people are inherently irrational; religious belief should be categorized as a mental disorder. The same can be said for liberalism--and probably conservatism. Certain faiths should be spread by the sword, rather than by reason.

The list isn't confined to any particular ideology; human intolerance knows no boundaries. And while some of the above is more rhetoric than anything else, one would could easily envisage violations of liberty which spring from these examples. Ironically enough, those who assert that those who disagree with them are irrational are almost always irrational themselves; and if lovers of liberty will not use compulsion to convince them of their errors, it must be admitted that an appeal to reason is unlikely to produce much in the way of results.

The strength of Mill's tract will, I think, depend on his ability to convince the former group of the fundamental importance of a complete commitment to liberty, since the latter seems unlikely to either read Mill, or be convinced by his efforts.

Thinking more on it, one simply objection to Mill's thesis is that is that while liberty is good and desirable, it is well nigh impossible to construct a government which does not at least occasionally and slightly infringe upon it. The central flaw, then, of this system, is that it a bit impractical. There are some ways around this, I think, and we may perhaps revisit them later; but to give but one example to illustrate this flaw, no nation can maintain a standing army without extracting revenues from its citizens to provide for its pay. We shall have to wait and see if Mill considers this criticism.

More on Morality (part 2)

And onward we tread:

This part of Kant's philosophy is quite fascinating, but unfortunately also quite technical. (It also contains some fundamental errors, in my view.) If you're interested in learning more, however, the _Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals_ is probably the best place to start.

I picked up Kant, almost at random, from a library several years ago. The experience proved less than useful, so I don't see myself picking him up again until I've approached his thought from an amateur level. Nonetheless, your suggestion is appreciated.

I'd be happy to debate this, but you'll first have to give some content to your maxim, "the government that govern least governs best." What is the least that a government can govern and still be a government? I'm not sure what the relevant criteria are; but, I still have to say, none of the candidates that I can imagine would make for anyone's choice government.

Briefly, I consider myself a libertarian, and thus a descendant of the classical liberals of earlier centuries--who, I will add, would be appalled by the degradation of their once good name.

Ron Paul, the presidential candidate I support, recently wrote a book that offers a good--and relatively short--primer on libertarian thought. But to summarize the principle in a briefer note, I quote from libertarian columnist Ilana Mercer:

This writer holds that the sole role of a legitimate government is to protect only the inalienable rights to life, liberty and property, and the pursuit of happiness. Why life, liberty and property, and not housing, food, education, health care, child benefits, emotional well-being, enriching employment, adequate vacations, ad infinitum, as promised variously by the remaining (viable) presidential contenders? Because the former impose no obligations on other free individuals; the latter enslave some in the service of others.

This government, that governs least, is one that also governs best. The founders did a reasonably good job of giving us such a government, with the lamentable exception of their toleration of slavery. It is to that form of government that all libertarians long to return.

But the story of the Fall is situated in a mythical pre-history: it doesn't explain anything. And, in any case, how does thinking about evil in these terms help you to minimize its presence in the world?

First, a number of intelligent people, Augustine springs to mind, held the myth to be true. The essential point isn't the talking snake, or the cleverly placed fig-leaves; the central fact is the racial sin of Adam and Eve, of which we all--save Christ and His mother--suffer.

Thinking about evil in terms of the fall is imperative for two reasons. First, it gives us the impetus and the power to mitigate evil by understanding its origin. Turn on any confounded talk show, and in between paternity tests, Oprah and her heirs will be explaining that the evil of which we are all capable is not our fault; it comes from a chemical imbalance in the brain, an absent father, or a drunk mother; being hugged too much--or too little. This placates the sullen masses, but it solves nothing; moving the guilt up a generation only begs the question. Worse, it removes from our view the only thing we can change: namely, ourselves.

Second, as Chesterton points out: "Without the doctrine of the Fall all idea of progress is unmeaning... Unless there is a standard you cannot tell whether you are rising or falling... If you wanted to dissuade a man from drinking his tenth whisky you would slap him on the back and say, "Be a man." No one who wished to dissuade a crocodile from eating his tenth explorer would slap it on the back and say, "Be a crocodile." For we have no notion of a perfect crocodile; no allegory of a whale expelled from his whaley Eden."

I don't ask you to believe in the Fall, but if you do not understand what it represents, you'll never be able to understand Christianity. I can provide a basic reading list if you'd like. I'm not intending to be condescending, but you appear to understand even less of Christianity than I do of your philosophers. You must have attended Catholic school.

Again, no self-respecting atheist invokes the concept of God to explain a positive phenomenon. I suspect the problem here is that you understand evil in theological terms that no atheist would accept. If you define evil as "that which results from the Fall," I simply don't believe in evil. But evil can be plausibly defined in more neutral terms, as I've briefly attempted, in which case it might be explained with reference to psychological disorders or, with a more philosophical conception, in terms of the structure of human action.

Aquinas points out that the existence of evil is the one real objection to belief in God's existence; if you're unimpressed with the objection, we need not dwell on it, but it comes up often enough that I felt compelled to at least address it.

Do you believe humans are capable of willfully and maliciously committing evil? If so, you either implicitly recognize the fall, or you believe that the universe is essentially amoral; beast competes with beast for evolutionary advantage without any regard to ethical concerns. Otherwise you must conclude that those who commit evil do so unawares--the Socratic paradox. I confess an inability to see any other alternatives.

No one is categorically prohibited from self-immolation, but there are very few circumstances in which it would be an ethical action, only in those extreme situations where it is impossible to go on living without surrendering oneself to the worst kind of moral depravity, e.g., in a concentration camp, perhaps, or in some kind of post-apocalyptic scenario where survival is impossible apart from an economy of cannibalization. (My inspiration for the latter: Cormac McCarthy's _The Road_ -- a fantastic read.) Self-actualization, by the way, is not merely one good among others. It's the framework in terms of which ends can appear as goods for us. In any case, if I still seem to be contradicting myself, please explain how.

What good is an ethical system that can't even "categorically prohibit" against "self-immolation"? Really now, you think Hegel and company are superior to Catholicism when you admit you can't even offer a defense against suicide?

The central flaw with your system, which I repeat again, is this: you wish to believe in self-actualization, but this so-called good must be tempered according to the society in which the individual is attempting to actualize himself. But surely you see how these can be in contradiction since there is no guarantee that the desires of the individual fit with his society.

Let us construct a society in which music is forbidden. Enter, stage left, Mozart, who wishes to actualize himself by becoming a brilliant musician. One day, while practicing, the society locks him up for violating basic societal protocol.

Now, either Mozart was wrong in attempting to become a musician, or the society was wrong to restrain him. If society is the higher good, than tyranny is acceptable as long as the society tolerates it. If Mozart's self-actualization is the greater good than "do what thou wilt" becomes the full extent of the moral system.

To take a more modern, and less apocryphal example--though the above is still very much valid--until recently, and for years still in some parts of the country, homosexuals were unable to self-actualize themselves in American society without fear--or worse. Now, who is in the wrong in this example, and why? I sincerely wish this question to be answered.

You're not the first to recommend McCarthy to me. I've made a mental note.

So you concede the point, but sincerely hope that historical trends continue and nothing too terribly bad (worse than the Crusades, the Inquisition, 9/11!) will come of ignoring it?

I concede that man does evil. This, you'll recall, is the ground upon which Christianity was built. Without the Resurrection, our faith means nothing, but without sin, there would be no need for the Resurrection at all.

I sincerely hope that historical trends reverse themselves. Our inability to learn much of anything from the twentieth century, and our refusal to turn to the Church, the only institution capable of resisting and correcting the excesses of man bear ill for us and our progeny.

This strikes me as quite extraordinarily irresponsible, at least from a political or philosophical point of view. (Morally I consider you to be largely in the clear, so long as you are not party to any such outrage and do your best to prevent and condemn them.) What I think you ought to conclude is that -- whatever your private faith -- our political culture needs to be guided by a different set of norms and objectives, fully transparent and publicly negotiated.

To quote Chesterton once again, "The Christian ideal has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and left untried." If the only things you can come up with to indict Christianity are the Inquisition and the Crusades--you forgot the St. Batholomew's Day Massacre, by the way--the Middle Ages were one of the heights, if not the height, of human history.

Precisely why should we abandon the Christian ideal? It can hardly be because men sin; Long ago, Christianity proclaimed that men did, and would continue to do so. Moreover, it alone offers men a way of ridding themselves of sin, and even freeing themselves, however gradually, and never completely, from its power. Hegel offers nothing that wasn't revealed in the Cross.

The abandonment of a principle for emotional reasons isn't a legitimate refutation of that principle. Limited government has similarly been abandoned, but it will one day again be esteemed, probably on the other side of the gulag.

Meanwhile, you can't even codify your ethics, and you want to guide society? Your rhetoric is no different than those who ushered in the French Revolution. After two hundred plus years of secular nonsense, and more dead bodies than Christendom could even fathom, it's time to stop pressing ahead to further bedlams. It's time to look back to a Truth too long neglected. Without it, we know full well what lays ahead.

I'm also opposed to totalitarianism, but I don't see how this is relevant to our discussion. You're the one toying with the idea of a monarchy.

Totalitarianism was a word invented by Mussolini to apply to his own government; it's a distinctly modern concept, and one that applies quite well to our current system. Monarchs had power, to be sure, but the biggest tyrant of the Middle Ages held far less power than does the average head of state today. A return to monarchy probably won't solve our problems, but it would at least move the facade of consent and legitimacy which shroud our silly little system. My animosity toward democracy is because it has brought, and continues to bring about, totalitarianism. I would support any system that can provide for a reasonable free society. Universal suffrage and totalitarianism appear to be closely linked; my antipathy toward the former stems from my hatred of the latter.

I believe you when you say that you oppose totalitarianism, but I must point out that a large number of atheist intellects, from Wells to Russell, to the Marxists of the twentieth century, adopted or supported totalitarian ideologies as a way to drag humanity along into their various utopias.

One of the weakest points of your philosophy is that it's simply not going to appeal to more than a few intellectuals. When that happens, will you--and more importantly, those like you--resort to government coercion to enforce your whims? I pray that it will be otherwise, but history demonstrates an appallingly strong recourse to violence among atheist leaders.

The contrast with direct democracy actually helps to underscore the merits of representational democracy. You are right that very few people do know how to run a country, which is a tremendously daunting task becoming more difficult by the year. We need teams of experts to do the research for us and put together a plan, which we -- that is, the public, with the help of the media, its watchdogs, and our experts of choice -- can then scrutinize to assess how well it takes our interests into account.

Americans have been calling for experts to run the government since they were overawed by Wilson's education; later they hailed Hoover as the "great engineer", whose expertise would help produce a better society. The central flaw in this argument is that it presupposes that what prevents government from working well is a lack of knowledge on the part of those who attempt to run it. The real reason government does not work is that most government programs violate the basic laws of the free market.

Depending upon our degree of satisfaction with the status quo, we can involve ourselves as much or as little as we like; we can campaign and run for office on our own platforms, or we can abstain from political life entirely.

We are free to do whatever we wish, as long as we do not question the basic assumptions upon which the system is based. Thus anyone can be president as long as the government continues to: claim a "right" to take a portion of our income; invade foreign countries; spend billions of tax dollars in foreign aid; devalue the currency to profit the plutocracy; leave the important decisions up to the nine unelected judges on the Supreme Court.

There is no discernible difference between the two parties; yet the cries will invariably ensue that this is "the most important election ever". Our choice is between destroying the currency--and the Republic--to bring democracy to the Middle East, or destroying the currency--and the Republic--to bring humanitarian aid to war torn regions of the world, which strangely never works, and provide "free" health care to Americans. Some system!

The candidate most acceptable to the greatest number -- with constitutional protections in place to protect vulnerable minorities -- will take the office, and she will remain accountable to her constituents so long as she values her public image (eventually, her "legacy") and, especially, so long as she wants to be reelected or to be replaced by another member of her political party.

The constitution is dead. There is nothing in the document to prevent the elected representatives and the appointed judged from ignoring it completely; thus that is what they do.
Incidentally, this is the same flaw of Protestantism; a text itself cannot be an authority since men are compelled to interpret it, and do so in conflicting ways.

Politicians, if they don't care only for themselves, can do plenty of damage in the eight plus years, for only the president must endure term limits, with which we grant them power. Bush has done a marvelous job of wrecking the country in eight years; I have no doubt that the next president shall follow suit.

This is not a perfect system, but it is the best I can think of. Dissent, of course, is part and parcel of the democratic process; so your libertarian voice has a recognized place.

Yup. On the Internet.

(Also, I can't resist pointing out, the American "masses" have achieved a degree of cleanliness with no historical precedent, and this has no bearing whatsoever on their rights to be each treated with equal concern and respect by the government. Why would you elect to air this kind of prejudice -- however tongue-in-check -- eludes my understanding.)

I have no idea of what you mean by "cleanliness" in this context. If it regards our so-called rights, I question the "cleanliness" of a society that interned dissidents, or "terrorists", under Lincoln, Wilson, FDR, and Bush--Johnson, too, if memory serves. I further add that a Catholic can only bear through clenched teeth a nation that asserts its moral supremacy while simultaneously undergoing an abortion holocaust in which the death toll stands at over forty-four million.

I deeply love the American nation. My malcontent stems from her rejection of the principles upon which she was so wisely founded, and my utter despair for any positive political change before we reach a stage of collapse.

Not at all. One needn't delve into the messy theoretical details of *why* it's possible to achieve political transformation and cross-cultural consensus in order to effect the positive change.

Name one positive societal change that has occurred from Kantian/Hegelian philosopohy. Name one thing you would like to change about society, and explain how Kant/Hegel would aid you to that end. If you wish, I can provide examples based on the Catholic philosophy.

As for the assertion that atheism is a layover to paganism, I've met plenty of extremely well-educated atheists who are not pagans, and am, myself, a reasonably well-educated atheist, also not a pagan; so I'm going to go ahead and say, contra Chesterton, that your claim is simply false. Yet, if you have an argument to show that we atheists ought, by virtue of our own commitments, to endorse some kind of paganism, I would very much like to see it.

Let me take, for our discussion, Hilaire Belloc's defintion: "Paganism at large may defined as natural religion acting upon man uncorrected [later he substitutes "unsupplemented"] by revelation." (Survivals and the New Arrivals, p.133) I shall do my best to summarize his argument, but it might be worthwhile to read chapter five, which concerns "neo-paganism" in full.

For all your self-assurance about a Hegelian interpretation of Kant providing a cogent system of ethics, you're no closer to answering any of the great questions that plague mankind than were the various noble pagans Dante left in limbo. But unlike Socrates, you seem quite unaware of the fact that there is much that your unaided human reason cannot understand.

Now, you and your associates will probably dive deeper into various philosophical tracts in pursuit of truth. Meanwhile, the rest of the world will tumble merrily onward, completely indifferent to the abstractions of the philosophers. But the rest of the world will not be content to live without faith; man must believe in something. Thus he turns, to science, to a vague spirituality, to political reform, and so on and so forth.

I will provide two further quotes from Belloc which can only hint at his argument. It is worth pointing out, too, that he wrote this less than a decade before the pagan Nazis plunged Europe into horrific war.

"Paganism despairs. Man turned loose finds himself an exile. He grows desperate, and his desperation breeds monstrous things." p. 134

"Before the advent of the Faith, even despair could struggle to be noble. But since the medicine for the despair has been known, those who refuse the remedy turn base." p. 135

The pagans of old were not without sense. After all, they converted.

We see paganism too, in the crowds surrounding the Obama campaign. According to any rational standard, there is nothing in the man which should produce anything approaching the messianic adulation which accompanies him wherever he goes. His oratory skills are better than those of the current commander in chief, but one shudders when considering how Americans would act if confronted with someone like Cicero. To understand the Obama phenomenon, I think, one must remember that man who has lost religion will quickly find another one.

I tend to think that there is a reason the Middle Ages are also known as the Dark Ages, and that "medieval" has acquired a derogatory sense (this in spite of the best efforts of my very sweet and very knowledgeable Dante professor, a specialist in the period).

The reason is that most of our history suffers from a very strong bias in favor of the Enlightenment and thus against Catholicism. Edward Gibbon, for instance, whose influence has been profound, has provided the world with a history well worth reading. Still, as much as I admire his work and enjoy his style, much of it suffers from a fundamental inability to understand the medieval mind. Dante is an apparition in the sense that all geniuses are, but he was a product of the Middle Ages. The Commedia alone should get you to reevaluate your lowly opinion of that wonderful period of human history.

You've demonstrated that history is not your strong suit, which is fine--I am similarly ill-equipped to discuss the minutiae of most philosophical systems--but you should be careful about making broad historical assertions that are demonstrably false. Again, I can recommend some books here, but the essential point is that the term "Dark Ages" has everything to do with who wrote the history books.

All that we need to acknowledge is that, from the fact that a certain institution, ideology, or set of policies kept the peace and maintained social order for some group of people at some certain time, it does not follow that that institution, ideology, or set of policies can do the same for an arbitrary group today. I can elaborate on this, but I think you should be able to see the point without further explanation. Consider, for instance, why not advocate for the Athenian model? (Talk about cultural flourishing!) Or the Ancient Egyptian? (Talk about cultural longevity!) So again, I happily acknowledge the many contributions that the Catholic Church has made to our civilization, but its political performance in the Middle Ages does not establish (does not even begin to establish) that it could enjoy similar success today.

I consider the Reformation, and the subsequent "cleaving of Christendom", in Warren Carroll's phrase, to be one of the saddest tragedies of history. This may seem odd, or even cold, given the significant violence which has occurred in subsequent centuries, but the modern world would be entirely different had the Church not been fractured. The tragedies of the post-Reformation world can all be traced back to the posting of Luther's grievances--though, of course, it would be absurd to blame him for everything he unintentionally let loose upon the world.

The problem with your analogies is that neither Athens nor Egypt offered the world what the Church still offers the world, even as many have forgotten Her. Now, if you really want to revive Athenian democracy, I can explain why I think this would be a bad idea, but the fact of the matter is, no one is all that interested in reviving Athenian democracy. A return to a Faith that literally means universal, on the other hand, will be called for until the end of time. The Catholic Faith is the timeless antidote to the problems which confront mankind.

I suppose you could say that the most general principle remains the same: promote flourishing, reduce suffering. But I'm reluctant to say that cavemen share a morality with us because of how differently they realized this ideal, how much drastic change there has been in the possible content of the good life available to us, and how changed are the conditions under which we pursue our various conceptions.

There are two problems to this line of thinking. First, unless you're counting revelation as a positive influence on morality--which runs counter to your whole argument--I see no proof that morality has improved in the slightest. Sometimes men honor the elderly and kill their neighbors; other times they produce great art and leave their deformed young to die; often they tolerate slavery and engage in promiscuity.

Second, I must reiterate, that without some standard with which we may judge morality, all conception of progress is meaningless. An improvement in ethics requires some static point of reference.


I'm sorry that this has gone long, but I wished to be as thorough as possible. As always, I await your response.

More on morality

The conversation continues apace:

The idea is that, because human beings are the source of all value, they themselves possess an absolute, unconditional value. It is impossible to set a price upon that without which "price" is inconceivable. My Hegel-inspired emphasis on society as the unconditioned good is just an extension of this Kantian insight. The two arguments share a structure and are complimentary because society subsists only in and through its individual members who subsist in their autonomy only in and through their society.

Again, I'm not familiar with Kant--for shame!--but since he was a theist, wouldn't he claim that God imbues humans with value? I'm asking only because I'm curious. You'll notice I've tried to concentrate on the parts of your response that highlight matter we've previously neglected to discuss.

It's perfectly possible to ground rights in something changeable, like social history, so long as it can be seen to change in accordance with some kind of logic or reason. The legitimacy of rights claims, then, could be assessed according to the rationality of the socio-historical transformations from which they emerge, where the ideal of freedom or human flourishing provides the benchmark for rationality. But I suggest this rather tentatively, and it would require a great deal of elaboration in any case.

You need not elaborate. But I'm curious, again--and feel free to but note the musing without responding to it--about how our rights might "change in accordance with some kind of logic or reason". Or rather, I'm unaware of how we would be able to tell how such rights changed if we couldn't determine the inner logic that compelled them to do so. Just some scattered thoughts.

On a semi-related topic, I'm not sure how familiar you are with C. S. Lewis. His book The Abolition of Man provides a short but sufficient look at what he calls the Tao--what I would call the Natural Law--and what it means for the development of a system of ethics. If you stumble across a copy, it's well worth a read.

On the contrary, this is precisely why we need democracy, transparency, and lively political debate. To eliminate government would be a disaster. Our well-being depends upon too many socio-economic systems and institutions of far too great a complexity for any individual to manage alone. These systems do improve our lives and provide us with real freedom. Yet, as they become increasingly global and interconnected, they also present an increasing amount of danger. But this is an argument for more, better government to responsibly promote our interests.

I very much disagree. Men, alas, not being angels, require government as a necessary evil, not so much to prevent man from doing evil, as to provide a system of redress when the inevitable occurs. "The government that governs least governs best" not because man behaves well without government, but because too often, rather than check the evil of the men under its control, government creates still greater evils. It's worth pointing out that, during the bloody twentieth century, a man was far, far more likely to be killed by his own government than at the hands of his fellow citizens. My argument here is based on my understanding of human nature, so it is informed by my Catholicism, but we need not get too far into what is essentially a political debate.

Well, you're right that I won't tell you what specific actions you need to take in order to have an ethical life, because I believe that there are many different ways to lead such a life.

I think it worth pointing out that the multitudinous saints lived lives that were often very different from one another; yet all lived quite ethically, at least insofar as the Church is concerned.

And, in my view, my position fairs rather better than yours with reference to the target metaphor. It is much easier to form a concrete conception of the good life, and to see that it can only be achieved with and for other people in just institutions, than it is to form an action-guiding conception of God.

I think you're forgetting that we Christians have revelation to help us in guiding our actions. One could certainly claim that revelation is bunk, or counter-intuitive, but it is the height of absurdity to suggest that the Church would be unable to form a code of ethics whereby the good life may be achieved. Think of an ethical dilemma, and the Church has thought about it; think about a profession, and, excluding those devoted to evil, the Church has had a member who has excelled at it.

PJ: I don't expect that we will ever eliminate evil -- and so we must always have some mechanism for managing its presence as best we can, when it appears -- but I don't see how this problem has any kind of foundational importance. (Additionally, some people do dispute your claim about the universality of our understanding of evil -- the argument of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, for instance, is intended to debunk this prejudice.)

Pepin has recommended that particular tome to me, so I hope to get to it eventually.

As to evil: one must have an understanding about what it is and why it has come to be so that one may minimized it and its effects. No? I have found that the doctrine of original sin and the story of the fall provides an excellent explanation for the existence of evil.

It's not possible to explain a positive phenomenon with reference to a non-existent entity, so Chesterton's atheist is a strawman. In any case, I'm not sure there is evil in all of us, at least not according to my earlier definition of evil as seeking to cause suffering for its own sake. Perhaps you can explain your position here?

I think the atheist explanation for evil would go something like this: since there is no omnipotent being to prevent evil from occurring, we're forced to endure it; if there were a God, He would have prevented evil from existing in the first place.

If we define evil as the causing of suffering for its own sake, then, going back to the example of the cat, and the fact that human beings torture the animal simply because they can, we must admit that something has gone dreadfully wrong with man. Now, I don't know if you've ever done anything evil, but I know that I have; in fact, I continue to do evil, despite my insistence--like Peter's--that I would never do such a thing. I'm not sure who else to blame for my sins unless it is my own miserable self.

This is completely consistent with my eudaimonistic position, as should be abundantly clear from what I've written heretofore. Notice too that I carefully specified that suffering is not a merely physical notion, but that the worst kind of suffering is spiritual, i.e., having to do with human freedom, with our inability to freely articulate and pursue our own conception of the good life.

I don't want to rehash things again, but you're contradicting yourself. I don't object to the fact that our inability to "freely articulate and pursue our own conception of the good life" may cause suffering. Nor do I insist that self-immolation may be a mite unpleasant. What I cannot understand is how you can claim that a woman who sincerely wishes to end her life is ethically prohibited from doing so. I cannot, for the life of me, see how self-actualization can be a "good" if it can be countered--seemingly at random--by an appeal to another "good". You need not attempt to explain this again since I'm clearing not getting it; only know that this is probably going to be a rather large sticking point for a number of people as it has been for me.

To the first part of this, all I can say is that I'll throw in my lot with democratic action over prayer any day (and you accuse me of wishful thinking!).

The phrase "wishful thinking" springs insensibly to mind when you expect democracy in the Middle East to bring about positive change. The brethren of those in Iraq have elected a panoply of terroristic groups to power. Purple fingers notwithstanding, I severely doubt that the Iraqis will prove better judges of character.

I don't expect you to believe in the power of prayer, but the saints, of which I have previously spoke, have all been canonized after prayers in their name led to miracles--a phenomenon I have no doubt you'd deny. Recently, the dedication of Russia to Mary by the Popes was one cause some credit to the fall of the Soviet Union, a fall which only seemed inevitable in retrospect, and which was undoubtedly heightened by the actions of the Polish Catholic group Solidarity.

Christ was insistent that His wisdom would seem foolish to the world. And so it goes.

The second part I find more alarming. The idea seems to be to provoke (and disavow) violence in order to spread an ideology that would otherwise, on its own merits, be rejected? (The more Catholic the world is, the more ethical, the closer we all are to our One True Purpose.) The reasoning here strikes me as dangerously close to that of the 9-11 hijackers. I don't expect I have to ask, after that accusation, but anything you could do to clarify your position here would be most helpful.

My reference to martyrdom was merely a very safe prediction of what will inevitably come should Christians attempt to evangelize the Muslim world. I do not support our President and his quixotic War on Terror, but as a student of history, I am less than impressed with Islam's influence on the world--even as I respect it as the most serious alternative to Christianity. Islam is an inherently violent faith, and one that refused to tolerate dissidents. Just ask Salman Rushdie. Christians are currently being martyred in post-invasion Iraq, and I have little doubt that a number of missionaries would suffer the same fate. Nonetheless, for the Church, such offerings prove propitious.

Thus far, the Muslim world has been impervious to conversion. One reason is that any apostate of Islam is condemned to death, but another is the inherent irrationality of the religion. In the Regensberg address, Pope Benedict drew ire for suggesting that Islam was being irrational when it insisted on using the sword to spread the faith. Quoting "the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus", the Pope noted: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”

He then added: "The emperor, after having expressed himself so forcefully, goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul."

In short, I do not seek martyrdom, either for myself, or for members of the Church. Nor do I believe that the Catholic faith require the sword to spread. But martyrdom may be required if we are to produce fruit in the Islamic world. Who knows where the Church would be without Diocletian''s persecutions.

Be careful, too, in conflating martyrdom with suicide. Missionaries who are killed preaching the Good News are worlds apart from those who fly planes into buildings to strike at the Great Satan.

This comes very close to some of my more general practical/ethical/political objections to religion. It seems to me any time a group of people think that they are in touch with a super-human truth and thereby endowed with a transcendent purpose, that jihadist and Inquisition-style projects begin to look alarming rational. After all, if you really believe that our immortal souls are at stake, or that you are doing the Work of the Almighty, a few human lives looks like an acceptable price to pay (however regrettable it may be that they declined your impassioned appeals to convert, refused to see the truth, etc.).

The religions of the world have undoubtedly caused a certain amount of evil. These are not to be excused or ignored. That said, while your argument is theoretically sound, the reality is that religious crimes have been infrequent. It is telling, in fact, that the Spanish Inquisition is one of the crimes for which Christianity must repeatedly answer. While the excesses should not be forgotten and must be condemned, I can only conclude that it is mark of the liberality of the Faith that an institution which led to 3,230 deaths over a span of over 350 years tops the list of scandals of the age. (The statistic comes from Henry Kamen's book, The Spanish Inquisition, which I heartily recommend to anyone who wishes to understand the topic.)

The brief retort, then, is that while possessing the Word of God might theoretically cause one to force men to believe, the Church has--thankfully--seldom resorted to force. Conversion, like learning, does not suffer compulsion. I can no more force you to become a believing Catholic than I can get you to profess that the sky is purple. My only hope is to explain that, while the Catholic Faith can never be reached by unaided reason, it is perfectly compatible with rationality. God's Grace must suffice for the rest.

One other point bears mentioning. The twentieth century witnessed a number of dictators--from Hitler to Pol Pot, Stalin to Mao--who attempted to remake mankind in their own image. None professed a belief in revealed truth, but all committed heinous crimes nonetheless. The importance seems to lie, not on what men believe to be truth--though this plays some role--but on their views of the value of their fellow human beings. It is also, I think, a caution against placing unchecked power in the hands of any one man.

Your second claim shocks me. Can you explain why you think that democracy (or universal suffrage) is "among the silliest of the ideas advanced by humankind"? I mean, what kind of government do you support? Where does the government get its authority if not from the will of the people to be governed? And how can anyone be assured that the interests of the people are served except by making one's case to them as a condition for holding office?

Let me first explain that when I'm speaking of democracy, I'm being a bit sloppy. Direct democracy strikes me as an intriguing idea--can you imagine trying to pass a budget in a nation of 300 million people, all voting over the Internet? When I spoke of democracy, I was referring to some form of representative government.

There are several flaws to this form of democracy. The first is that it provides a false pretext for governmental authority. In this pitiful presidential election of ours, we are again faced with a very poor selection of candidates. Nonetheless, the cretin that emerges victorious will use the "will of the people" to do all sorts of nefarious things. At least half the populace--myself included--doesn't even vote. The competition of two very similar parties may provide, in H. L. Mencken's phrase "the only really amusing form of government", but I can't see how the will of the people has anything to do with it.

The second is that democracy assumes that the unwashed masses have the foggiest idea of how to run a government. I firmly believe that all men are children of God, but that virtues should be spread evenly throughout the species strikes me as far too fabulous. History teaches that the number of people capable of producing a good government is small--perhaps ten or fifteen percent of the populace. Letting all and sundry vote is a sure recipe for disaster. As a libertarian, I can't help but chuckle when I recall that the first tenant of Mussolini's Fascist Manifesto was universal suffrage. Totalitarianism via democracy is the road on which we will travel.

I have thought too little on ideal government, since all of my suggestions are impractical, but I think I should like a monarchy. I am also reminded of Voltaire's ideal government--the statement may be spurious--a soft despotism tempered by the occasional assassination.

I concede no such thing. I claim simply that there are many ways to lead an ethical life, and that I do not presume, a priori, to know the conditions under which my way might be an improvement for anyone else. In any case, it's both easy and useless to pass judgment on other people, whatever their culture. The real challenge is to effect reform, and I think I have the conceptual framework, in terms of human flourishing and suffering, to make the case for improvement on an individual basis.

On this point I must staunchly disagree. It seems to me that one of the largest drawbacks to your philosophy is that it is only effective among a small group of well-read humanists, most of whom will be content to read books and avoid morally questionable endeavors. I have previously pointed out that atheism is but a layover on the way to paganism. Save for a few intellectual types, a Hegelian interpretation of Kant isn't going to sway the masses. As Joseph Knecht discovered in Herman Hesse's excellent The Glass Bead Game, whatever the virtues of humanism, it will always fall short in producing massive societal change.

As for the Church, she has produced her reform. Say what you will about the theoretical shortcomings of Catholicism, the empirical results are in. The middle ages of Europe can be called many things, but they were certainly of marked difference from the vast stretches of barbarism that surrounded the decadent Roman Empire.

Self-actualization is not "do what thou wilt." Furthermore, it is constrained by society primarily in the sense of being made possible by society, because it's only in terms of the language and practices handed down to me by my historical community that I can articulate a self-conception to actualize. Society, here, is not a force outside of the individual to which it could be opposed. Do you understand the point I'm trying to make here? It runs counter to some popular intuitions, but I think it's incredibly important to appreciate, philosophically. To your request, I still don't understand what you want in terms of lines or definitions beyond what I've already said. I just don't believe that the subject matter of ethics can be deduced a priori or catalogued exhaustively.

I think I'm beginning to understand, but it's a very different way of looking at things, so it will take me some time to contemplate.

I suppose I probably do. Truths have a "subjective ontology," which is just a fancy way of saying that they exist only in thought (even if their objects -- the content that makes them true -- often exist independently of whatever we may think). Since there was a time when there was no one thinking, and since there will be such a time again, we can say for this reason that there are no eternal truths. But I don't know if this is what Sartre meant. Why do you ask?

I ask because it came up in my reading, because I knew you had read Sartre, and because the idea of absolute unchangeable Truth is essential to my worldview.

In any case, I very much doubt they had our highly reflexive kind of moral consciousness.

The idea of an evolved morality makes little sense to me. I can see how we might take some time to abolish an evil practice, but I can't see how the morality of a caveman should differ fundamentally from mine, save in the instance of revelation. Aristotle was wiser than the caveman, but I see no reason why their morality should not have aligned.

Once again, I continue to enjoy the conversation. I thank you for your patience, and look forward to your response.

The coming faux-conservative defeat

A good friend sent this along, courtesy of Sean Hannity. This is his idea of what McCain needs to do in order to be President of the United States. Let's examine these points, shall we:

1) To be the Candidate of National security:
a) Victory in Iraq
b) Fully support NSA, Patriot act, tough interrogations, keeping Gitmo open
c) A Candidate that pledges to NOT demean our military while they are fighting for their Country. eg Harry Reid: "the surge has failed", "the war is lost"
d) Candidate that promises to ensure that our veterans can live out their lives in dignity.

Iraq cannot be won; more to the point, as polls demonstrate, it's a losing issue. Torturing terrorists and spying on Americans is not only immoral--by virtually every ethical standard imaginable--it's wholly ineffective. Point c) is irrelevant. The last one is a good point, but it would be better to simply stop sending the troops to die for pointless causes.

I note, too, that Hannity has listed National Security as the most important issue. But this has never been the raison d'etre of the Republicans, and one need look no further than point one to see why the GOP is heading for a beatdown of historic proportions in the fall.

2) The Candidate who pledges to oppose Appeasement:
a) The Candidate will oppose any and all efforts to negotiate with dictators of the world in places like Iran, Syria, N.Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela without "pre-conditions"

Negotiation is a necessary step in the diplomatic process. As Pat Buchanan has repeatedly pointed out, FDR negotiated with Stalin, and Nixon talked with Mao. I find it impossible to believe that any of today's third-rate dictators are in the same league as the two biggest tyrants in history.

3) The Candidate Pledges to support Tax CUTS, and fiscal responsibility:
a) The American people are NOT under taxed, Government Spends too much
b) The Candidate who Pledges to ELIMINATE and VOTE AGAINST ALL Earmarks
c) The Candidate pledges to BALANCE the budget

Funny how Hannity ran Ron Paul out of town for running on these very points. Of course, Ron also has a record of fiscal conservatism, which probably makes him unpalatable to the neo-conservative Hannity. A hawk who is fiscally liberal is more at home in today's Republican party than a principled non-interventionist who has a proven record of fiscal conservatism. That's all you need to know.

Reagan and Bush both increased spending. You have to go back to Coolidge until you see a real spending cut. I don't know if Paul could cut spending in Washington. But I do know that moderate John McCain can't. Believing otherwise is foolish.

4) The Candidate Pledges to be a supporter of "Energy Independence"
a) supports Immediate drilling in Anwar and the 48 states
b) Building new refineries
c) Begin building and using Nuclear Facilities
d) expand coal mining
e) realistic steward of the environment
While simultaneously working with private industry to develop the new energy technologies for the future, with the goal being that America becomes completely energy independent within the next 15 years.

I'm all for drilling domestically, but would someone please tell me what the government has to do with oil supply? How hard is it to deregulate, get out of the way, and let the market go to work?

And what does work with private industry even mean? If the market can support an alternative form of energy, it will. If it cannot, government coercion is only going to waste taxpayer money, though I suppose it will also provide jobs for otherwise unemployable art majors.

5) The Candidate pledges to secure our borders completely within 12 months:
a) build all necessary fences
b) use all available technology to help and support agents at the border
c) train and hire agents as needed

This is a particularly stupid point, and not because I disagree with Hannity about the importance of border security. The fact of the matter is that it is impossible to defend a border as large as ours is, especially with two wars going on elsewhere in the world. As for the fence, despite the legislation that passed that requires it, it's quite simply never going to get built.

The solution to the illegal immigration problem is simple. If you remove the incentives which draw illegals to America, they will go back home. Imposing exorbitant fines on companies that hire illegals will cause employers to balk at the costs incumbent on getting caught; they will thus cease hiring illegals. The barbarians will then return to their own homes.

6) Healthcare:
The Candidate will look for Free-Market solutions to the problems facing the Healthcare industry, and will vigorously oppose any efforts to "nationalize healthcare".
a) The Candidate will fight for Individual health savings accounts, that includes "catastrophic insurance" for every American, so people can control their own healthcare choices.

Question: if the government keeps your money as "catastrophic insurance", whose money is it? It sure isn't yours. Sometimes Big Government conservative types like Hannity get confused about what a free market solution really is.

7) Education:
a) The Candidate pledges to "save" American children from the failing educational system
b) The Candidate will fight to break the unholy alliance of the Democratic party and teachers unions, which at best has institutionalized mediocrity, and has failed children across the country
c) fight for "CHOICE" in education and let parents decide
d) fight for vouchers for parents

The correct response is to abolish the Department of Education and let the states do the work. The federal government should have no role in educating the unwashed masses.

Alternatively, I would also accept "burn the schools" as an answer.

8) Social Security and Medicare:
a) The Candidate will "save" social security and medicare from bankruptcy.
b) Options will include "private retirement" funds so people can "control" their own destiny.

What about letting people opt out of a socialist retirement scheme? Again, if your private account is held by the government, you're not the owner of anything--save your chains.

The quickest way to "save" socialist security is to stop pouring money down the rat hole known as Iraq.

9) Judges
a) The Candidate vows to support ONLY judges who recognize that their job is to interpret the Constitution, and NOT legislate from the bench.

Finally, we agree on something. Now raise your hand if you really think John "gang of fourteen" McCain is going to appoint another Scalia. All of those with your hands up have failed the intelligence test necessary to secure your ability to vote. Better luck next election.

10) American Dream:
The Candidate accepts as their duty and responsibility to educate, inform, and remind people that with the blessings of Freedom comes a Great responsibility. That Government's primary goal is to preserve, protect and defend our God given gift of freedom.

That Government's do not have the ability to solve all of our problems, and to take away all of our fears and concerns. We need their pledge that we will be the candidate that promotes Individual liberty, Capitalism, a strong national defense and will support policies that encourage such...

It is our fundamental belief that limited Government, and Greater individual responsibility will insure the continued prosperity and success for future generations.

We the people who believe in the words of Ronald Reagan, that we are "the best last hope for man on this earth," "a shining city on a hill," and that our best days are before us if our Government will simply trust the American people.

Ignoring the fact that our best days are almost certainly behind us, notice that this contradicts almost all of his actual points. A government that is big enough to protect everyone from the hobgoblins that always threaten us is one that is, by definition, inimical to liberty. That Hannity seeks to use the government to offer "free market solutions" to problems caused by the very government which he clumsily champions is proof enough of what his conservatism really is.

I have never regretted abandoning the republican party, but I am going to be unusually thankful when McCain gets slaughtered in the Most Importantest Election Ever in November.

More on the matter

My worthy adversary writes:

I've explained, at least to my satisfaction, that there are lots of goods, irreducible to one another, and that the reason an object (or an end, more generally) can appear as good is rooted in our biology.

I can't think why it has taken me so long to ask it, but do you believe in free will? If you don't, I can't see what good a conversation about ethics would do--though, admittedly, I've never been able to fathom how one could disbelieve in free will. I'll refrain from quoting Rush. On the other hand, if you do, you surely realize that humans may do all sorts of things contrary to biological impulses. The use of birth control, for instance, provides a telling example of how humans thwart such impulses.

One could add to this that society -- as the ontological foundation of the practices in which these higher goods subsist -- is the unconditioned good, without which there would be only a Hobbesian struggle for survival and none of the spiritual fulfillment of the kind supplied by recognitional networks.

You have hit upon one of the tenants of Natural Law theory, in which sociability is held to be one good; though, of course, all goods, in the Christian tradition, come from God Himself. The important fact, however, is that sociability is not enough. One could make an argument that the various despotic realms, especially those of the twentieth century, maintained sociability. They are ethically flawed, however, because they routinely violated other precepts of Natural Law, most blatantly in their flagrant disregard for human life, another good.

In short, a barbarous anarchy may be preferable to a human society if it is not in agreement with the basic tenants of morality. This is a point I have been at some pains to convey to you: it is impossible to vest the moral compass with a society of men because man is almost hopelessly fallible.

So we have to step in to protect the dignity-conferred rights of the intended victim. We institute laws and support an executive branch to enforce them, to physically apprehend those who are a danger to other people and society as a whole. The existence of such a branch serves as a reason not to break the law, and, if someone exercises her freedom to break it anyway, well, there are the feds to do their job and protect the rest of us as best they can.

I'm not sure what you mean by dignity, at least in this context. Our rights are inalienable because they come from God, or they are simply the results of what the people believe them to be. We know where that road may lead. This is a point the secularist of the EU implicitly recognize; "human rights" is an amorphous term because, unless it is grounded in something unchangeable, these rights are nothing more than the whims of the feds to whom you would go for protection.

Your scheme may work well enough, but your rhetoric can't mask the fact that this is basically wishful thinking. Government, especially when governed by those who answer to no one, is far more likely to coerce by violence and violate our so-called rights than it is to protect them. This is one of the largely unlearned lessons of the twentieth century, and, indeed, all of human history.

Art, like morality, consists in drawing the line somewhere, as Chesterton put it. If you don't draw moral lines, and merely put your faith in people's ability to influence their government to govern well, you will end in a nightmare of disappointment.

You would say, I expect, we ought to behave ethically because we are the children of God, and that God in his divine wisdom has ensured that when everyone behaves ethically in this way, that we will all get along without too much stepping on anyone's toes.

Jesus insisted that He came to divide, so I don't think your last assertion is true. There are two reasons for the Christian to behave ethically. The first is an extension of the principle of the policeman at the corner, only God has better eyesight. The second is that God is Goodness itself, and therefore worthy of our loving service. Sin is an offense against God, and harms our neighbors, but often it is the sinner himself who is harmed most, as Roskolnikov discovered.

This is very much analogous to my claim that because of what we are (satisfaction-seeking, self-conscious beings) and because of how the good life is structured and conditioned (in terms of social networks of recognition) it is overwhelmingly in our best interest to behave in an ethical way that also promotes shared social goods.

Agreed. But the difference is very important. In my argument, every human being seeks God as his ultimate end. Your end is not defined. If I label it for you--as I am wont to do--as pleasure, a bit of a crude translation, you resist, saying that this is not what you mean. If I point out that you cannot have society as a good because society can be, and often is, bad, you again reject my claim and point out that it is more nuanced than that. Very well, but you cannot expect me to believe that a series of "goods", rooted in nothing more than wishful thinking, can possibly be a reasonable way to ground a system of ethics. If you do not tell men what to aim at, they will inevitably find lousy targets. And hit them.

The discussion of the cat, frankly, was rather cryptic. Further explanation of what a soul is and how you see it figuring in this debate would be most helpful.

On this point, I think I can be of some service. Chesterton's point was that everyone starts with the understanding that evil exists. We have atheists like Woody Allen who lament the underachiever for creating a world so full of evil. Meanwhile, Christians wrestle with what is probably the most significant objection to the existence of an all-powerful and all-good Being. In fact, according to Aquinas, the existence of evil is the only real objection to the existence of God--though not an unanswerable one.

Anyway, the point is, no matter what your views on God, you no doubt feel that the world has somehow gone wrong; things could be better. The next thing one notices, is that it is not simply natural disasters and the like that are the cause of evil. Man is capable of much evil of his own. We can come to this conclusion from any number of observations. For instance, we may view with moral indignation the abuse of power, and the pain and suffering which it brings. But it is best to find this evil in one's own heart, for this allows us to get at the root of the problem.

Chesterton's point was that there were two good explanations for the evil present in every one of us. The first is the atheist's: The absence of God is all that is necessary for evil to triumph. But the Christian has his explanation as well: Man has disobeyed, and is separated from God; but once God deigned to walk among us, and paid the price for our disobedience; through Him we may be saved. In other words, evil is a result of sin.

Self-immolation causes unnecessary suffering.

This isn't necessarily true. We can concoct any number of scenarios in which it would be better to immolate oneself by fire. A widow would possibly endure great suffering, especially as her failure to immolate herself would cause social ostracization. It would be likewise difficult, based on what you have said, to have convinced Hitler to have refrained from eating his gun. Or, to use another example, if Christ, while waiting for Pilate's decision, would have drank the hemlock offered to Socrates, He would have relieved Himself of tremendous suffering. Only a firm grounding in the goodness of human life, regardless of the pain it suffers, offers a legitimate defense against the evil of suicide, in any of its forms.

If we can't do this, we need to seriously consider the possibility that our way is not so superior as we fondly like to think. Given what I recall of your views on Iraq, I find it positively weird that you suggest, however obliquely, that the way to improve the world is to march in and proselytize.

I think the answer is to pray fervently, and to evangelize, which often leads to martyrdom, the blood of which was the seed of the Church, in Tertulian's phrase. My antipathy toward the World Democratic Revolution in Iraq is that the exchange of human life is not worth the establishment of a so-called democracy. Actually, I think democracy, or at least the principles of universal suffrage, to be among the silliest of the ideas advanced by human kind.

On the other hand, bringing the Good News to the Iraqi people would be a worthy goal. It would not cost any lives--if done right--and would even ameliorate the present situation--as the religious often build hospitals and the like in the communities to which they offer witness. If asked why I do not partake of such I can only posit that I am a coward. Thankfully, moral weakness isn't a reason one may be excluded from the Church.

More on point, you essentially concede that you have nothing to offer a community, whose ideas differ from your own, in the way of a rational argument. Cultural relativism, which you seem, at times, to support, renders moral progress impossible, because it removes the standard by which such progress may be judged.

The reason -- or at least, one reason -- that the sort of relativism you're worried about can't take hold is that all cultures are shaped and constrained by our biology. They all bottom out at the same place, as it were.

I would agree, but I would add that our biology was literally shaped by the Fall. The only conclusion I read from my amateur study of human history is that evil is ubiquitous, but various. Bottoming out must be taken almost literally; where man meets man is at the crossroads of depravity.

People suffer needlessly whenever they are denied the proper conditions for flourishing, whenever they are deprived of existing resources for free self-actualization.

But you've repeatedly stated that freedom must be constrained by society. Self-actualization--do what thou wilt--is consistent only with anarchy. You could argue, as Christians do, that freedom consists in choosing to do good, but, again, this leaves you with the need to draw some lines or define some goods.

I have two things to add in closing. First, I came across this quote from Sartre in my readings of Kreeft's excerpts of Aquinas: "There can be no eternal truth since there is no divine mind to think it." Do you agree? Second, setting aside my skepticism toward macro-evolution, when the first human being evolved, was it a moral agent? Or did it require the evolution of other humans for him to achieve that status?

I merely ask that you give these questions your consideration. As always, I look forward to your response.

Why not to support moderates

The moderate Republican is pleased:

A day after the state Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples should have the right to marry in California, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger said Friday that he supports the court's decision even though his personal view is that "marriage is between a man and a woman."

I tend to believe that the gay-marriage issue gets far more attention than it deserves. Unlike the abortion issue, no innocent parties are being harmed in the process, and it's not as if the sanction of the government to sodomy changes much, at least in how Christians are concerned. A sin is a sin regardless of whether or not it is approved by the state. Still, I am not a Republican, so my views on this issue are different than many of the GOP rank and file. And though it's probably true that most of them are intent on supporting the good ship McCain as it sinks in November, California's governator provides a good look at how "moderates" tend to govern.

Then again, if Republicans were capable of recognizing betrayal, they would have turned on Bush long ago. Still, it bears mentioning that, while Bush's Supreme Court nominees have yet to stab the party in the back, the California ruling was brought to you by Republican appointees. In this light, it's going to be increasingly difficult to defend voting for McCain on the grounds that he'll appoint good Supreme Court justices.

UPDATE: I just saw this on Drudge:

California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger created shock and awe in the Republican Party when he warned years ago that the GOP was in danger of "dying at the box office" by failing to make the sale to a wide swath of voters...

The answer for GOP presidential candidate John McCain: take a page out of the Schwarzenegger playbook and sell a product that is "counter" to the current GOP brand on issues like global warming, spending and even immigration reform.

There are two problems to this line of thinking. The first is that it doesn't work. Ronald Reagan is a hugely over-rated President, but he captured moderates, not by running as a wishy-washy moderate, but as a principled conservative. That he failed to govern as such is lamentable, but beside the point.

The second problem is bigger. If politics were all about winning, you could legitimize running as a complete charlatan. But if your goal is to shrink the size of the federal government--forget that this is not the Republican's goal--you can't run a bunch of "big spenders".

The Republicans appear to have learned nothing from the Bush years. It's going to take a considerable amount of time in the political wilderness before they remember why they joined the party in the first place. Two or three decades should do the trick.

Kidnapping the children, for the children

By now, everyone knows a little bit about the Texas polygamous "cult", and the allegations made by CPS to provide cover for their little kidnapping. I've neglected to cover the topic, because Vox Day has covered it here, here, and also on his blog--most recently here. Ilana Mercer has also done a good job covering the kidnapping.

Still, this is a big story, and deserves comment simply for that reason. Ilana summarizes the point nicely:

Whether they are "plural" or single, Wicca or just weird, bohemian or bourgeoisie – parents should take the kids and skedaddle when they hear that phrase "in the best interests of the child." It is simply a license for the state to substitute its own judgment for that of the parents. Today, it's polygamist parents – Kool-Aid drinkers is Bill O'Reilly's favored sobriquet. Tomorrow, it'll be the offspring of homeschoolers or global warming deniers.

I merely add that a nation that allows more than four-hundred to be taken from their parents on the basis of a fraudulent allegation--the woman who originally called in the complaint wasn't in the compound--without a smidgen of due process is not free. Worse, a nation that accepts such a blatant abuse of government power lacks the will necessary to secure its freedom.

The dialog continues

I started to write my response in the usual manner: quote, rebuttal, quote rebuttal, etc. But I noticed that I was asking the questions I had asked before, the questions that inevitably seem to arise when an atheist attempts to formulate a system of ethics: What is Good, if not God? Where does it come from? Granted that there are a number of ethical systems which a man may utilize in striving to live ethically, why is he compelled to live ethically at all? These seem to be the fundamental questions, and I ask them up front to avoid repetition later.

In any event, I'll stick with the usual format, if only to avoid having to rewrite. I'll also try to avoid asking questions which I have already asked, and do my best to answer those posed to me.

Maybe you've already explained this, but what do you think human nature is?

I would say that man is composed of body and soul. He is both a moral agent and a rational one; the ability to distinguish between right and wrong is what separates man from the beasts. Further, I believe human nature is fraught with concupiscence. Thus while man longs for God who is Good, because he is a fallen creature, man sins; like St. Paul, we do what we do not want. (Romans 7:16)

And how do you know that the features you select are part of nature rather than the historical accomplishments of human culture?

Since you can't test for a soul—anymore than you can dust for vomit—you'll have to either accept or reject that one on faith. Still, aside from the notion of man as fallen, I don't think there's anything in my definition with which Aristotle would disagree. As for the fall, it so happens Chesterton said it best. After noting that the doctrine of original sin is “the only part of Christian theology which can really be proved”, he notes:

Some followers of the Reverend R.J.Campbell, in their almost too fastidious spirituality, admit divine sinlessness, which they cannot see even in their dreams. But they essentially deny human sin, which they can see in the street. The strongest saints and the strongest sceptics alike took positive evil as the starting-point of their argument. If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two deductions. He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians do. The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution to deny the cat.

In short, I think my definition, although slovenly constructed, is entirely valid and complete enough for the sake of our little intellectual duel.

Why does it matter?

Because we'll never get anywhere if we can't define our terms. If human nature is always changing, then so too will be the “good” which applies to that nature. This is an entirely permissible explanation, but I think it rather clear that this excludes the possibility of a logically coherent system of ethics.

On the other hand, the values attached to different practices and modes of life have an economy largely autonomous of our biological nature, and this is the realm in which we exercise our freedom and exist as ethical beings. So I prefer to focus on society, and to look for answers to ethical and moral questions in terms of the individual's embeddedness in her historical society.

You posit that we are ethical beings. But you have yet to define the terms “good” and “evil”, which are necessities for any ethical choice. You've spoken repeatedly of values, from which good and evil may arise, but I see nothing in your presentation that would prevent a “historical society” from valuing disparate things. And, indeed, if we study history, we will see that various societies have done precisely this.

For instance, one of the more charming practices of India was the rite of suttee, in which the newly widowed immolated herself on her husband's funeral pyre. Now, Christians have a code of ethics which precludes self-immolation, and, in this case, the evangelization of the island helped lead to a reduction in the practice; it was eventually abolished in 1829 by the colonizing British. But, to go back several centuries, there was nothing in the “historical society” of a poor Indian woman which would discourage her from self-immolation. I see no grounds upon which you could condemn this practice to her.

Ethically, raping people promotes violence that's likely to spill back into your life unexpectedly, it's going to feed into all kinds of destructive cycles, and is massively unlikely to contribute to a fulfilling human life... Rapists suffer from a confused conception of the good life. The satisfactions of nonconsensual sex are hollow and fleeting.

While I would tend to agree with you, my agreement arises out of our shared cultural heritage. The Judeo-Christian culture teaches that rape is a moral wrong, and a grave one. But rape hasn't always been considered wrong in all cultures, as Vox Day points out.

Understand, I am not so much disagreeing with you as I am unmoved my your reasoning. Much of what you say could be readily applied to the promiscuous culture of too many institutions of so-called higher learning. The satisfactions of consensual sex are hollow and fleeting as well. Vanity of vanities and all that.

Much of ethics seems to be little more than applied common sense, but the vicissitudes of human behavior suggest that this simple appeal isn't likely to suffice. We live in an age when millions of unborn children are slaughtered so that women can live what they feel is “the good life”. Naturally, this appalls my Christian sensibilities—and I think it evinces a violation of Kant's second formulation of his categorical imperative—but while one could insist that these women are not actually living the good life if they refrain from abortion, one could make a case--in my view a much stronger one--for precisely the opposite. Thus, while our conceptions of the good life are probably very similar, until we define this term—or at least ground it in an objective system of ethics—most any behavior could be seen as consistent with “the good life”, which is the exact problem that the ethical system should aim to solve.

You determine for yourself, inasmuch as you determine anything for yourself, who you want to be. We each have our own conception of the good life. The point is that this conception cannot be formed in a vacuum.

This seems reasonable, but it remains unclear as to where my ability to determine my own “good life” leaves off and is curtailed by that of my “historical society”. Thus, we would both agree that, within our “historical society”, becoming a good rapist is a contradiction in terms. But I see nothing in what you have said so far that would prevent the contradiction from disappearing in a society that chose to value nonconsensual intercourse. To me, on the other hand, because God is the source of goodness, rape is always wrong, no matter the values of a particular society.

Where do you think we get our literary standards?

We get our literary standards from our culture, but they're ultimately unsound in determining whether or not a writer has achieved the "good life". If you asked Americans to compile a list of the good writers of today, those who can actually read would come up with names like Stephen King, Dan Brown, J. K. Rowling, Danielle Steele, John Grisham, perhaps Tom Clancy and Michael Crichton. Occasionally, great writers receive deserved adulation from their contemporaries, as Charles Dickens and Shakespeare did in their time, and Umberto Eco does in ours. But many good writers suffer the fate of Melville. Only the Father who “sees in secret” (Matthew 6:4) is capable of rewarding—or punishing—humans according to their actions. Culture sometimes rewards virtue; often it punishes it; oftener the two possess no obvious relationship at all.

To elaborate on this and to show how we begin to achieve an autonomous world of value, I quote from a paper I wrote on Hegel's Phenomenology, of which I sent you a copy a few weeks ago.

For some reason, I never got the paper. If you send it, I'll do my best to read it, though I confess with my background in philosophy as limited as it is, it will probably prove beyond my ability to understand.

Lastly, since my admirable antagonist references phenomenology, I'll share this passage I recalled from George Weigel's Witness to Hope:

It was phenomenology's determination to see things whole and get to the reality of things-as-they-are that attracted Karol Wojtyla [the future Pope John Paul II]. In his habilitation thesis, he asked whether it was possible to create a solid philosophical foundation for the moral life on the basis of [Max] Scheler's phenomenology of ethics, and particularly the ethics of value...

The question Wojtyla posed in his habilitation thesis was whether Scheler (and, by extension, the phenomenological method) could do for contemporary Christian philosophy and theology what Aristotle had done for Thomas Aquinas.

The answer, for the young priest, essentially, was “No.” The moral act is a real act with real consequences, and to Wojtyla's mind Scheler had failed to come to grips with how moral choices actually shape a person. Therefore, in Scheler's system, morality was still suspended somewhere “outside” the human universe. Wojtyla was also critical of Scheler's tendency to emotionalize experience and consciousness, leading to a truncated portrait of the human person...

Phenomenology would drift off into various forms of solipsism, however, unless it were grounded in a general theory of things-as-they-are that was resolutely realistic and that could defend the capacity of human beings to get at the truth of things... If the choice was not between good and evil, but only between personal preferences, then all choices were ultimately indifferent and real choice no longer existed. This, in turn, would empty the drama of human freedom of its essential tension and deprive human beings of their most distinctively human quality. (p.127, 129)

As always, I look forward to your response.

Re: Response to me (part 2)

This will conclude my response to PJ--for now--after which I will allow him to make a rebuttal. I've attempted to keep my response brief. Naturally, I've failed. Should there be something which you believe I did not address sufficiently, do let me know so that I may revisit it.

Ah, but human nature does change and with it, the social world. Our "first," material-biological nature is the product of evolutionary forces, of course; but morality is a relatively new phenomenon, in the vast time-scales of the life sciences, and it can only emerge for beings who develop our kind of social "second" nature.

This strikes me as peculiar, and seems to add more questions than it provides answers. Supposing I accept your premise—which I cannot—several questions arise. I've given you more than enough to chew on without compelling you to answer all of them, but they are worthy of consideration. Is human nature equal in all its members, or are some humans “more equal than others?” Does one's moral code depend on one's place in the ever-evolving human nature? Is human nature moving towards something, away from something, or are these fluctuations essentially trivial in the grand scheme of things? I sense much Wells in you.

If you could provide a list of differing human natures and an ethic which would apply differently to two of them I would greatly appreciate it.

Rather, selfhood can only be cashed out in terms of irreducibly social commitments and identifications.

This seems to suggest that man draws his worth from those men around him. But if those men are similarly without value, whence does this value arise? If you sum zero infinitely, it is still zero. Unless man has worth—in my view because God bestows him with it—mankind is effectively worthless.

The "glass" is a mirror, the idea being that, reflecting on God, we are reflecting on ourselves without realizing that that is what we are doing.

Only if God's revelation isn't really what we claim. I think it mighty unfair to our ancestors to insist, looking down upon them from several centuries of perhaps not entirely worthless experience, that they were merely reflecting on ourselves—and projecting onto God? To revisit Moses, theoretically he could have been reflecting on himself, though one wonders why on earth he would insist that he should go confront Pharaoh over his Jewish problem. In addition, as Vox Day points out, “I Am Who Am” may be a silly thing for a bush to say, but it's also a silly story for a nomad existing several centuries before Christ to invent.

To be utilitarian, a theory must advance a single, comprehensive, conception of the good -- in terms of utility -- and then it must stipulate that the moral worth of an action is determined by the extent to which it maximizes that good. I, on the contrary, believe that there are a plurality of real goods and that we have to give priority to ourselves and the people close to us (although I won't directly defend the latter part of this claim, unless you're especially interested).

While I greatly enjoyed Atlas Shrugged, I'm no objectivist, so I won't fault you for believing we have some duty to those close to us. Still, while your plurality of goods makes a certain amount of sense—natural law theorists similarly posit a number of goods: knowledge, procreation, life, and sociability, if memory serves—it begs a question. I'm afraid it is one I have asked before: whence do these goods arise? It leaves you with something of a Euthyphro dilemma on your hands. The natural law theory points to God as the source of all good. Your goods point to... either satisfaction—which would be utilitarian—or... what?

The satisfactions of helping someone solve a difficult problem, of listening to a symphony, and of enjoying a glass of fine wine, for instance, are qualitatively distinct in such a way as to preclude quantitative comparisons.

Well, you could help someone with the problem of what on earth is to be done with his fine wine while listening to a symphony, but I agree. The problem is when we consider such acts which are not morally permissible ones. For instance, in choosing whether to violate a virgin, murder an old woman, or rob a bank, are we similarly left with the problem of quantifying our satisfaction. But if we add, to the list of options, “or read a Walker Percy novel”, of course you should pick Percy, but not because he is an excellent writer, but because this is your only permissible moral choice. Even if one derives no satisfaction from reading the novel--especially if one doesn't know how to read English very well--this is still the morally correct choice.

Now, obviously no one would ever be confronted with these bizarre choices, save perhaps in a novel, but the point is that the satisfaction which is implicitly posited as the determining factor in considering what one should do. No matter how much satisfaction our hypothetical character may derive from ravishing a virgin, moral standards prevent him from acting on what is essentially a utilitarian principle. Our virgin thanks him.

This isn't to say that all decisions are equally good or that it doesn't matter what one does with one's life, only that the relevant standards must be supplied by the individual's conception of "the good life," her sense of who she is and who she wants to become.

I don't wish to be more of a jerk than I've already been, but if we return to our virgin, if I wish to go about, being the best rapist I can be, what standards would you posit to compel me to do otherwise?

Notice, now, that working toward the good life requires a minimal kind of self-consciousness: it is not just a matter of activating pleasure-centers in the brain, but of achieving describable goals -- however these may shift about in the course of a life. It is, in other words, a matter of *self*-actualization.

You are pronouncing judgment against merely activating pleasure-centers in the brain. Well and good, but on what grounds? Michel Onfray, from the little I know of him, would vociferously disagree; he would assert that you are preventing him from attaining self-actualization. In addition, if self-actualization is the good at which man's life is aimed—yes I know, you say there are a number of goods, but unless I am mistaken, I see here a contradiction—then you are stating that man is the rule by which all things are to be measured. This makes sense from a God-less perspective, but it rather deflates any chance of promulgating a coherent and lucid system of ethics.

Furthermore, it is up for social negotiation whether my deeds fall under the act-description I invoke and whether I live up to the identity I claim for myself.

Again, I may be making mistakes here, but I'm unclear as to how society may dictate to me whether or not I am progressing towards self-actualization. If society has a claim to my behavior, fine, I suppose, but this can very certainly threaten my ability to become the self that I desire to be.

For example, there is no intelligible sense in which someone might "really" be a good professor in spite of his inability to capture the attention and imagination of his students and colleagues.

Sure there is. Perhaps his students are all dunderheads, or that they don't give a whit for the subject matter, or they're distracted by text messages from their friends. There are any number of, if not professors, writers who “succeed” despite an inability to write well. Those who pen harlequin romance novels are well-received by their audience, and I suppose we could bequeath upon them the title of Producer of Much Emotional Porn and Other Sundry Nonsense, or some such twaddle, but I don't think you or I would take the verdict of their audience without a grain of salt.

To be clear, what is important is not that there always be another person physically there affirming your success to you, but only that the standards by which you assess yourself are essentially social standards.

And again, I reject this. Moby Dick was very poorly received when it was written. If memory serves, some French interest revived the piece, and placed it in the pantheon of great American literature. Now, on the one hand, the social standards which Melville could have used to determine his worth as a writer failed him. On the other, one could argue that the verdict of posterity was essentially a social one, which is true; but then one would be forced to conclude that Melville was a good writer only because people rediscovered his book, and not because he was, in fact, a good writer.

Without shared social practices, standards, and ideals, human life would be reduced to a pathological hedonism. We have an obligation, therefore, to maintain the most fundamental of these networks -- the conditions of lawfulness itself -- by respecting the dignity of the self-conscious agents in which these networks subsist.

This strikes me as a particularly poor argument. Anarchy is undesirable, therefore, we must have law. You peer into the abyss, and because you don't like what you see, you embrace an ethical code which is neither clear not compelling. I don't think poorly of you because of this decision, but an emotional aversion to hedonism isn't the best base upon which to rest a system of ethics.

I eagerly await your response, and thank you again for continuing in this quest for truth.