This is part two of our five-part series on John Stuart Mill's essay in political philosophy, _On Liberty_. Just to remind anyone who hasn't followed all of the previous comments, the text is in the public domain and freely available on online; regularly assigned in survey courses, it is also easy to find used copies. Let me add that Mill has a highly discursive and wonderfully readable style. The essay is a pleasure to read, and anyone with an interest in political philosophy should be at least acquainted with the arguments presented therein.
I should also mention, because I don't know how this post will be formated, that it is PJ writing, not the blog owner, Eric. We're alternating summary pieces on Mill's essay. That he would so graciously invite me -- an atheist with communitarian sympathies -- to contribute to his Catholic-libertarian themed blog suggests that we're already in substantial agreement about the subject matter of this chapter of Mill's little treatise: the liberty of thought and discussion. Millsian plaudits to you, Eric!
So, to begin: The second chapter of _On Liberty_ is essentially a defense of free speech in the form of an argument for the advantages of "a free marketplace of ideas."
Human beings, Mill observes, are lulled into taking for granted the truth of a great body of opinion handed down to them and reenforced by socialization in its many, diverse forms. Much of what appears to us as unquestionably self-evident is, in fact, the result of peculiar historical contingencies, and appears quite strange and false to others outside of our cultural purview. Yet Mill has no especial interest in epistemology per se. He immediately proceeds to acknowledge that we should not -- indeed, cannot -- cease all activity, merely out of concern to avoid unfounded knowledge-claims: "If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed."
What Mill is concerned to establish are the advantages of the public scrutiny of opinions: "There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation." (Mill is eminently quotable, so decisive and succinct; I'll restrain myself as best I can.) There is no special mark of truth, shining forth with an irrefutable radience; yet, Mill is optimistic that open debate does more to expose the truth than conceal it. So long as we are forced to defend our beliefs with reasons, we cannot substitute our inner certainty -- the shear obviousness that so many of our beliefs have for us -- in place of actual evidence in favor of their objective (or intersubjective) validity.
As a separate, but related point, Mill goes on to add that most opinions are neither entirely true nor entirely false, and that partial truths are corrected equally well by public debate.
Another, more interesting (and perhaps contentious) set of claims, concern the *intrinsic* value of public debate. Whereas the opening claims attempt to establish public debate as the most effective *means* of arriving at the truth, Mill now turns to argue that this same debate actually contributes to the *value* of said truth. By being reminded always of competing opinions, and thus having to continually expound on the practical and epistemological merits of our own position, we maintain a more "lively apprehension" of the truth than we would otherwise be able. In fact, there is a sense in which we *do not know* the full truth of our doctrines unless we *understand why* they, rather than some alternatives, are true. Furthermore, and relatedly, to allow a truth to quietly sediment into the body of received opinion is to deprive the doctrine of "its vital effect on character and conduct"; we can no longer delight in the truth of that which we thoughtlessly take for granted.
In the interest of getting this posted more expeditiously than is my usual wont, I'll refrain from further commentary for the time being and just leave it at the summary.
I look forward to everyone's comments --
Cheers, PJ
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17 comments:
Hi PJ, thanks for the summary.
It’s been years since I’ve read On Liberty, but as you point out, Mill is so highly readable that it’s quite easy to remember the contours of his argument even years later.
Because of his theoretical commitment to utilitarianism, it’s no surprise that Mill evaluates freedom of thought and expression in terms of utility, advantage, and practical benefit.
As I recall, the argument is really quite simple, something like: (1) The world is awash in opinions, (2) we’re fallible, (3) the surest means to true belief and knowledge is vigorous, open debate. (4) Ergo, no opinion should be suppressed, period.
Of course, it’s a fine argument, for what it does.
I mean, in order to establish its contrary one has to argue for it, which presupposes the very freedom Mill wants to defend.
Do you see any limitations with his argument?
Do you buy it?
Anyhow, I’m eager to see what you have to say about Mill’s treatment of society and the individual in his formulation of the no harm principle.
Best,
Kevin
Kevin,
Glad you could stop by! I'll let PJ answer your question first, as I have yet to finish my assigned reading. For shame, I know.
PJ,
I'll try to finish the reading by tomorrow night, after which I'll offer my comments. Good work on the succinct summary.
Thanks in a big way. I'm having trouble reading the comments on Vox's blog, so I've been investigating his list of blog links. This is a silver lining if ever there was one.
It's really interesting to hear someone else talk about fear of being wrong. Better to be proven wrong than do or say nothing, reminds me of the verse in Proverbs where it says "Faithful are the wounds of a friend, but deceitful are the kisses of an enemy".
An interesting but insipid contemporary trend is the that of ignoring people on the internet. An example: I've done a lot of work in a certain field, when asked to do a detailed historical renovation that was related to my usual work, I contacted a historical society. Everything was going fine, but based on my previous work, I thought they might have sent me less than detailed info.
That was all it took, I guess. He could easily have said "This isn't like the other projects, the original work was done differently, and the artwork we sent is quite accurate".
But no, now I'm on the ignore list. Oh well, nothing new, it's like the pursuit of truth gets sunk to the axles in the slough of spinelessness.
Hey Kevin,
I'm most glad you could join us! Answers are interspersed below:
K: Because of his theoretical commitment to utilitarianism, it’s no surprise that Mill evaluates freedom of thought and expression in terms of utility, advantage, and practical benefit.
PJ: It actually seems to me that the liberal emphasis on rights is a point of considerable tension -- if not downright incompatibility -- with utilitarianism. But since, as far as I know, no one here identifies as a strict utilitarian, I don't think this is much of an issue for our purposes. In any case, I agree with Mill that human interests, in some broad sense of the term, must provide the ultimate frame of reference for any political theory. The central question to be resolved is of how best to mediate in cases of conflicting interests.
K: As I recall, the argument is really quite simple, something like: (1) The world is awash in opinions, (2) we’re fallible, (3) the surest means to true belief and knowledge is vigorous, open debate. (4) Ergo, no opinion should be suppressed, period.
PJ: Nicely put.
K: Of course, it’s a fine argument, for what it does.
PJ: I assume that what you intend with this qualification is that there may be different procedures of verification required in other spheres of discourse (as in math, the natural sciences, academic philosophy, etc.)? If I assume wrongly, could you elaborate on your qualification?
K: Do you see any limitations with his argument? Do you buy it?
PJ: First, it's important to be clear about the intended scope of the argument, which I think is the point you intend above. Teachers, for instance, are not entitled to say in class whatever silly things spring into their heads, but must responsibly transmit those doctrines best supported by the available evidence, as interpreted by the elites of the field in question. The argument, to state the matter in more general terms, assumes an audience with sufficiently developed critical faculties to assess for themselves the merits of the various theories promulgated. So it would also be impermissible to make clinically unsubstantiated claims about available medical services to the general public, however firmly one believes in one's own heterodox theories about the functioning of the human body. (But, per Mill's argument, the medical establishment would be ill-advised to completely disregard the claims of unconventional procedures.)
Yet, as I think about it, I'm also leaning heavily on the harm principle in both of these examples. After all, I don't see it as important to regulate the speech of, say, crank mathematicians -- even though many potential audience-members would be unqualified to assess the truth of their numerological theories on objective, mathematical grounds.
So I guess I would want to insist that theories be evaluated by established experts in those cases where bad theories would be likely to harm innocent people. Mill, of course, would be in complete agreement (and likely says so somewhere in his essay).
This has been a rather digressive response, I afraid. Let me just mention hate speech as one other domain potentially in need of regulation. I don't have it in me right now to attempt a comprehensive exposition of an argument for the curtailment of hate speech, but I would welcome anyone else's thoughts on the matter. I expect there are good arguments to be advanced on both sides.
K: Anyhow, I’m eager to see what you have to say about Mill’s treatment of society and the individual in his formulation of the no harm principle.
PJ: This has already emerged as an important point of contention between Eric and myself. Have a look at the comments to the previous post on Mill's "Introductory" chapter. I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on the matter.
Best regards,
PJ
Hi PJ, your dog-sense certainty has picked up the trail my ambivalence, when I write, "Of course, it's a fine argument, for what it does."
You observe, "I assume that what you intend with this qualification is that there may be different procedures of verification required in other spheres of discourse (as in math, the natural sciences, academic philosophy, etc.)? If I assume wrongly, could you elaborate on your qualification?"
With this qualification, I'm not thinking about alternative procedures of verification. Instead, I'm voicing a dimly felt concern, as if a Kantian warning light has gone off and I just don't quite know what to make of it.
My hesitation is this, Mill's defense is good, in that he's clearly opposed to restrictions on freedom of thought and expression, but in doing so on utilitarian grounds, I wonder (and worry) if Mill's defense, while good, is anemic and weak.
Arguably, restrictions of thought and speech might be justified on the grounds that it isn't a means to true belief and knowledge or that it's contrary to utility, advantage, and practical benefit.
But this is only a dimly felt concern, and I'd have to think about it more carefully before saying anything more on the matter.
My hunch, however, is that Mill's argument can be given enough of a deontological spin to quiet one's inner Kant.
Lastly, you write, "Let me just mention hate speech as one other domain potentially in need of regulation. I don't have it in me right now to attempt a comprehensive exposition of an argument for the curtailment of hate speech, but I would welcome anyone else's thoughts on the matter. I expect there are good arguments to be advanced on both sides."
This promises to make for a lively exchange.
I firmly believe that hate speech, even the most vile and detestable speech acts, should be protected in the public realm.
As Kant says in _What is Englightenment?_, "The public use of man's reason must always be free." Of course, the private-public distinction needs to be parsed out — no easy task!
Anyhow, following Kant, here's a list of dangerous ideas MIT cognitive scientist Steven Pinker says can and should be debated in the public realm:
*Do women, on average, have a different profile of aptitudes and emotions than men?
*Were the events in the Bible fictitious?
*Do most victims of sexual abuse suffer no lifelong damage?
*Did Native Americans engage in genocide and despoil the landscape?
*Do men have an innate tendency to rape?
*Did the crime rate go down in the 1990s because two decades earlier poor women aborted children who would have been prone to violence?
*Are suicide terrorists well educated, mentally healthy, and morally driven?
*Are Ashkenazi Jews, on average, smarter than gentiles because their ancestors were selected for the shrewdness needed in money lending?
*Would the incidence of rape go down if prostitution were legalized?
*Do African American men have higher levels of testosterone, on average, than white men?
*Would society be better off if heroin and cocaine were legalized?
*Is homosexuality the symptom of an infectious disease?
*Is it be consistent with our moral principles to give parents the option of euthanizing newborns with birth defects that would consign them to a life of pain and disability?
*Have religions killed a greater proportion of people than Nazism?
And lastly, there is Peter Singer's exploration of the last great taboo, namely, bestiality, which he argues is not necessarily "an offence to our status and dignity as human beings."
Best,
Kevin
References:
Kant, What is Enlightenment?
http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/what-is-enlightenment.txt
Steven Pinker, In Defense of Dangerous Ideas
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dangerous07/dangerous07_index.html
Peter Singer, Heavy Petting
http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001----.htm
Hi PJ, I've been thinking about what you said, when you write, "Teachers, for instance, are not entitled to say in class whatever silly things spring into their heads, but must responsibly transmit those doctrines best supported by the available evidence, as interpreted by the elites of the field in question."
I think there's room in Mill's conception of freedom of speech and "compulsion" to accommodate the incompetent teacher, the shock jock, the hate-mongering evangelist, and so on.
The key thing for Mill is that they're all absolutely entitled to think and say what they want, entitled in the sense that "society" should not compel them to silence with force or the threat of force, ever.
If a math teacher wants to devote a unit to denying the Holocaust (perhaps as a way of working with sums less than six million), that's the teacher's prerogative.
Of course, it's also the school administration's prerogative to fire incompetent teachers, and presumably that's precisely what would happen.
So the teacher's freedom of speech hasn't been abridged.
I'm reminded of Don Imus and his "knappy headed hos" remark. He's entitled to think and say what he wants, just as his employer is entitled to fire him.
To lose a platform for one's ideas, no matter how harebrained, is not to lose other platforms in the public arena.
Desktop publishing, the Internet, street corners, Op-Ed pieces, casual conversations, and other avenues exist to express one's worldview.
Cheers,
Kevin
PJ,
I thought of the difference between debate in the UK and in the US governments while I was reading comments regarding the free expression of opinion in public debates in relation to the discussion about the treatise "On Liberty."
The debates that I saw televised from the UK were energetic and relatively brief. The debates were directed directly to the Prime Minister who used them to share information. It could be said that the free speech was directed by the utility of information sharing.
Debates in the US are more formal and lengthy. It is a larger and younger country and the rules of order are different. The debate was directed to the legislative body in regards to pending acts of legislation. In this case, free speech was directed by the utility of legislation.
Naturally, free speech was "directed" in both cases. We were not subjected to the profane proclamations that were defended as protected by the US Court system (I am not asserting that profanity is totally unacceptable in all cases. I simply don't want to restrict the definition of free speech to the defense of profanity.)
I am sure that much of what I have been taught about the acknowledgement of opinions was derived from J.S. Mill. The passages that you cited from Mill clearly address the matter and demonstrate that the ideas are expressed in the essay under consideration.
It is possible that Bacon's advocacy for the reduction of contentiousness had been adopted with too much aggression. If contentiousness is reduced to the point of elimination, then the exchange of information is reduced to oppressively restricted levels.
J.S. Mill may have had to 'prime the pump' for an increase in the free expression of opinions.
Ironically, if the logicians were speaking with certainty regarding their logical perspective and the empiricists were speaking with certainty regarding their scientific perspective, the norm may have become one wherein an impasse had developed between the different parties.
Thus, the importance of clarifying perspective as a reflection of opinion could reduce the sense of impasse and increase the possibility of reconciliation between the polarized positions.
The acknowledgement of opinions or beliefs also maintains an avenue of connection with human rights as an important political issue in the utilitarian oriented activity of government.
Some of J.S. Mill's opinions strike me as inappropriate or outdated in today's society, but this underscores another value of admitting to the influence of opinion. The opinions seem to serve as 'markers' of significant events that were contemporary at the time.
Steve K.
Oh well, nothing new, it's like the pursuit of truth gets sunk to the axles in the slough of spinelessness.
For what it's worth, there appear to be a number of people on the Internet who are quite ready to pursue truth. I suppose the lack of intellectual honesty emanating from all quarters can be disappointing, but I can't help but believe that Mill would have smiled at the Internet, at least in its conceptual form. In any event, a hearty welcome to you.
Before getting to the discussion already underway, I'd like to quote Mill:
It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic... but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation.
I couldn't agree more. One wonders what Mill would think of what passes for intellectual discourse in modern society. But I digress.
Overall, I find Mill's argument to a good one. His belief that open discussion will aid us in our search for truth strikes me as a bit optimistic, but it certainly beats the alternative; and in any case I see no reason why freedom of thought and speech should be prevented.
That said, I have three minor problems with his argument. First, he doesn't delve into the harm principle enough for my tastes. Would libel or slander constitute harm? Or does the adage about sticks and stones here apply, allowing us to say whatever calumny should drift into our minds?
Second, while I agree that open discussion is generally a good thing, there is something to be said for leaving sleeping dogs lie. For instance, the truth that the earth is round--well, approximately anyway--isn't likely to suffer if we should fail to engage often in objections to this now obvious truth.
To take a further example, and to connect it with the harm principle, let us say that I insist that on the first of July at 9:00pm, PJ murdered such-and-such a person. All PJ need do is find witnesses to corroborate that he could not have done said crime, probably because he was in a far removed vicinity. Let us say that, unmoved by reason, I repeat my tale. At what point does the harm caused to PJ necessitate that I no longer voice my ridiculous thought?
Third, is there a limit to the realm of free speech? Must the government allow anyone, anywhere to voice whatever they wish, or is allowing for free speech on the Internet sufficient to prove that the government values freedom?
Aw shucks, those are EASY questions, I'll bring you perfect answers.....
Next year, maybe the one after.
Seriously though, this idea of endorsing hate speech legislation is very disturbing. I wanted to start pondering the matter, so I went and looked up the terms libel and slander in the dictionary.
I suppose that those who seek to render their behavior beyond reproach would like us all to consider critisism of said behavior a large scale form of slander. As i'm writing this, it occurs to me that the distinction might lie in the difference between saying Pj murdered such and such a person, and saying murder is bad.
The level of complexity in our world is difficult at times, comforting at other times. Since my field is NOT law, it's a good thing that such matters have been for years examined by intelligent men, and we don't have to rely on the musings of persons as myself.
It's time for me to go Googling, to try and find some of the precedence and accumulated wisdom on the matter that must surley be extant.
Hi Kevin,
I don't think Mill's argument has an especially utilitarian form. I'd have to re-read to be sure, but I don't think there's any talk of "maximization" or even much emphasis on "happiness." What he is interested in defending and promoting in the essay is "liberty," which is taken to be intrinsically good for reasons that actually have a bit of Kantian ring, in that the argument begins with some vague notion of human flourishing ("the permanent interests of man") and argues transcendentally that liberty is a necessary condition for said flourishing. (I may be reading in too many of my prior philosophical convictions, but this is how I'm reconstructing the argument in my head.) The one place I remember Mill addressing utilitarianism, it is just to reaffirm his commitment, which appears to conflict with his insistence upon legal rights, and to clarify that he is concerned with "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (p.70 in the Penguin edition, in the second part of the Intro). But this notion of utility is more like that of Aristotle's eudaimonia; it claims to be grounded in objective conditions of human existence. (The palatability of Mill's conception of the human being is a question to which I hope to return later in the essay.)
I think we're largely in agreement about the protection of free speech, assuming we could work out a non-controversial set of boundaries for the public realm. (And I like Pinker's list, by the way.) Out of curiosity, calling a black man (or woman, or child) a nigger, just walking down the street: okay, or no? Why or why not? Does your answer or justification change if one is speaking from behind a pulpit in an explicitly public capacity?
A different way of approaching the problem, which Mill hints at himself, is to establish the point at which speech becomes something more than (or other than) merely speech. He gives the example, as I recall, of someone saying something to a mob that incites them to immediate, unlawful behavior. Speaking, sometimes, is tantamount to acting, and in these cases must be treated as such. You know a bit more speech-act theory than me. Does this seem like a promising strategy?
With regard to a teacher's freedom of speech in the classroom, I think I want to stick to my original position. In her role as a teacher, a person should be obligated to pass along the established knowledge of the discipline. You're right that incompetent teachers ought to be fired, but without these normative constraints, we lose many of the standards by which competence can be assessed. Parents should have a right to legal recourse when, for instance, their children are being taught that the world was created a thousand years ago by the Christian God. I do, however, believe that teachers, when they are not in front of the classroom, are entitled to the same freedom of speech and expression as everyone else, and that their exercise of this liberty must not be held against them by school administration, so long as they responsibly preform their teaching duties.
Cheers, PJ
Hey Eric,
Good points! Comments below:
1) I definitely think that individuals ought to have legal recourse in cases of slander and libel. Harm to one's reputation is a genuine harm. I would propose that we be allowed always to vigorously express our disapprobation of another person, but that we must not fabricate falsehoods about that person. For instance, it would be okay for me to take out space in the newspaper to denounce you for the degenerate (let's say) political and religious ideas expressed in this blog. But it would not be okay for me to adduce as additional evidence of your depravity that you sexually abuse furry animals.
2) This is what I had in mind when I mentioned that Mill's second set of justifications might be somewhat contentious. I am largely sympathetic to his vision, but it does evince a decidedly intellectualist conception of the good life. Someone could be forgiven for wanting to just get on with things and cease always having to recite the reasons for long-established beliefs. In any case, I don't think this objection poses any practical obstacles for the theory; after all, Mill doesn't argue that everyone is obligated to defend her beliefs to the satisfaction of her opponent, but only that such public debate tends to truth-tracking and is commendable for this reason.
3) Free speech on the Internet is definitely not sufficient. Mill wants to protect the right of free speech in all public venues (private venues obviously not requiring any protection).
Finally, a few questions for you:
What limits, if any, do you think ought to be imposed? Also, since you do a better job of following politics than most of us (at least, better than me), let me ask if you see any troubling instances of the liberty of free speech being curtailed in the U.S. today.
Cheers, PJ
Hi Raker T,
I think you're right to emphasize the distinction between asserting that someone did something (a matter of empirical fact) and ascribing a certain valuation to that action (a normative question).
Empirical facts persist in their factuality whatever we may think of them. Yet we, as members of a human society, are responsible for establishing and maintaining our normative framework; there is no extra-social fact of the matter to which we could appeal to finally justify our ideology, ethical code, or legal system. Hence the need for vigorous debate about the merits of our existing social order: it is what we've made it, and there is no a priori reason for claiming it's the best it could be, let alone that it is the single way that things simply are.
If your informal legal research turns up anything interesting, I hope you'll share it with us.
Cheers, PJ
Hi PJ, interesting that we both pick up on the Kantian aspect of Mill’s argument, that to argue against liberty of thought and expression presuppose the very freedom that allows us to promote “the permanent interests of man” in the first place.
As for walking down the street and calling a black man a “nigger,” it’s a moral outrage, unquestionably, because of its racist underpinnings and the painful punch it packs.
Hate speech warrants correction and instruction, but not curtailment of speech.
I don’t think my rationale would change if hate speech issues from the pulpit or the radio or the TV, although in these public positions, correction and instruction may very well include the loss of one’s job or function.
But this would need to be assessed on a case by case basis.
I agree with everything else you say about teachers’ obligations and responsibilities and their freedom of speech.
Best,
Kevin
A Wiser Man Than I (WMTI, for short) voices three concerns about Mill's argument: (1) Does libel or slander constitute harm, (2) when truths are obvious, do they require open, vigorous debate, and (3) is there a limit to the realm of free speech?
(1) and (3) are difficult while (2) is easy enough to dispatch.
Regarding (2), Mill is likely to agree with WMTI. Open, vigorous debate presupposes uncertainty. If a statement of fact or an evaluative judgment passes into everyday knowledge, there's no reason to debate it. It's a common notion, in Spinoza's language.
(1) is tough because there are really two issues here: (i) How do we distinguish between constative and performative speech acts, and (ii) what constitutes harm.
Clearly, uttering falsehoods about a person is a kind of performative speech act, insofar as it harms a person's reputation and hence the person himself.
By running afoul of the no harm principle in a fairly eggregious way, it's permissible to silence libelous and slanderous remarks by compulsion.
With respect to (ii), it's impossible to come to a universal agreement that covers all particulars.
Just as we must argue for the utility of an opinion, so too must we argue for what constitutes "harm" in the private and public realm of thought and expression.
While there will obviously be a good deal of agreement in any community about what's harmful, there will just as obviously be a good deal of disagreement, as well.
This is perfectly unavoidable.
Advertisers in the herbal supplements industry, for instance, think it's perfectly acceptable to bandy about unsubstantiated claims, whereas consumer advocates beg to differ.
In my circle of friends, it's perfectly acceptable to gossip innocently about others, whereas in other circles "loshen hora" is strictly prohibited.
As for (3), I think there is and should be a limit to the realm of free speech. And I also think it's perfectly consistent with unconditional support for the First Amendment.
I'm reminded of gay-hate pastor Fred Phelps who praises 9/11, CA earthquakes and fires, and every disaster that strikes a state he hates, which is to say all of them.
His freedom to think and say what he wants should be protected but not necessarily his freedom to say it *where* he wants to. Enter: Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, a restriction on the realm of freedom of speech, but not freedom of speech per se.
Best,
Kevin
What limits, if any, do you think ought to be imposed?
I have no real objections to the harm principle, but it's rather difficult to define what constitutes harm. To try to keep this rooted in practical considerations, I would say that, in general, designations of hate speech are inimical to the liberty Mill seeks to protect. On the other hand, I can't say that we'd gain much as a society if everyone--as opposed to just racists and gangsta rappers--started to use the n-word frequently.
I know I'm not exactly answering the question, but the key is in recalling why Mill makes such a defense of free speech. The basic idea is that we cannot allow ideas to be held sacrosanct without subjecting them to some level of scrutiny. Thus, I would say that using the n-word doesn't further the debate, or really challenge any long-standing idea; on the other hand, discussing the matter of race, although contentious, would be beneficial for society and should not be curtailed.
Also, since you do a better job of following politics than most of us (at least, better than me), let me ask if you see any troubling instances of the liberty of free speech being curtailed in the U.S. today.
As a libertarian, I stand sufficiently outside the Republican/Democrat divide to see it as nothing more than a false dichotomy of one ruling party. Curiously enough, my current roommate, who hails from the left, made the same pronouncement several years ago, so I think there's a good deal to be said for this theory.
While there is very little outright suppression of speech, I see the media framing the debate in such a way as to present the aforesaid false dichotomy as if it represents the full spectrum of political thought. This was a substantial theme of Ron Paul's latest book.
To give but one example, although claiming to represent different economic schools of thought, neither party questions the legitimacy of the Federal Reserve, which undergirds--and undermines--our entire economy.
The system then, conveniently gives a pretense of supporting open discussion, while ensuring that any genuinely different ideas are safely regulated to the far corners of the Internet.
Hi Kevin and others,
I'm wondering if some provision against *harassment* -- together with those against libel and slander -- might be sufficient to address my concerns about hate speech. This way we can protect individuals from harm without having to forbid any specific ideas from the public realm. Calling people niggers quickly becomes harassment, except in those cases where someone is actually propounding a racist theory about society, which, again, is morally reprehensible, but should not be *legally* curtailed so long as it remains merely verbal.
In fact, Mill might add, to get racists involved in the give-and-take process of rational discussion, to actually allow them the space to make the best possible case for their beliefs, may help to minimize racism in our society: a theory can be refuted, whereas an epithet can only be condemned.
Cheers, PJ
Hi Eric,
Eric: I have no real objections to the harm principle, but it's rather difficult to define what constitutes harm.
PJ: Indeed. I'm going to re-post some of my comments from our discussion of the Introductory in hopes of generating some discussion from those who've just joined us:
"As I see it, the main challenge Mill sets up for himself in the Introduction is to develop a sufficiently robust conception of 'harm' such as to make his famous 'harm principle' productive for actual cases. I find the most direct statement of the principle at p.68:
"'[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.'
"It's compelling for its simplicity -- and it definitely captures something very important -- but is it really the one true principle by which all government action can be assessed? Is there such a principle? As I said, I think the answer will largely depend upon how broadly we are willing to construe 'harm.' Two of the examples you introduce are quite apt in this regard: Is anyone harmed by the presence of vulgar language or pornographic imagery in the public sphere? Some people claim to be. But then some people claim to be harmed by criticism of government, which in many cases genuinely offends a deep-seated sense of patriotism. And it's not obvious to me that there is any objective set of criteria by which we could assess the legitimacy of these various claims.
[....]
"I think it's indisputable that 'harm' needs to be taken in a more expanse sense than the merely physical. I believe Mill would agree that any infringement on our liberties counts as harm in a relevant sense. For instance, don't we want the government to protect our property, even when that property is unrelated to our biological well-being?
"I agree with you, though, that the broader our conception of 'harm,' the more individual freedoms we forfeit, and that we do not want to sacrifice any of our freedoms without very good reasons. The challenge is to figure out what counts as a good reason so that we may achieve a reasonable balance between our individual liberties and those of others around us."
The rest of your discussion about racist epithets strikes me as quite reasonable. Yet, with your references to Mill's intentions, rather than his stated principles and the arguments he offers to defend them, you avoid committing yourself to any determinate views on the success of his theory, which is what I think is especially important for us to assess.
Eric: While there is very little outright suppression of speech, I see the media framing the debate in such a way as to present the aforesaid false dichotomy as if it represents the full spectrum of political thought.
PJ: Have you read Chomsky & Herman's _Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media_? They are motived by quite a different social ideal than you, but share an interest in expanding the spectrum of political thought actively debated in the public sphere. I haven't read it since high school, but, as I recall, they describe five specific socio-economic mechanisms that function to filter the kinds of content delivered by the mainstream media. It might be worth looking into.
Or do you have a theory of your own about why libertarian ideas are not given adequate attention? A skeptic might suggest that it is simply because they have already been considered on their merits and decisively rejected as unrealistically utopian (or conspiratorial, or inhumane, or whatever you like). If addressing this question doesn't connect back to Mill, feel free to ignore it or postpone your response.
Cheers, PJ
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