After a number of posts on the subject of ethics, along with vaguely related topics, PJ suggested we read On Liberty by J. S. Mill. After agreeing, I proposed a format in which we will alternate posts on the five sections of the book. The idea is less to convey the central tenants of essay than to discuss the applications thereof. Should anyone wish to join in, the irony would be too heavy to allow us to do otherwise than to allow it. Here goes:
Mill cuts to the heart of the matter starting with line 442:
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
A libertarian would find little in these lines to which he would find reason to object. Nor, I think, would most people, of whatever ideological bent, object to these point--at least in the abstract. Mill is careful to exclude children--he speaks "of full age"--but otherwise asserts a threefold liberty, checked by what strikes one as quite reasonable bounds, the most important of these bounds being that which precludes us from causing harm in the exercise of our liberty of pursuit.
Again, I don't think that this is much to object to, but only in the abstract. Mill admits as much:
Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice.
Thus it is worth considering why the mass of men prefers to use compulsion to prevent people from engaging in perfectly legitimate freedoms. To take but one example, which seems prescient given the passing of George Carlin, there are certain words one is not allowed to use on television. The FCC, an arm of the federal government, enacts fines for the use of any of a number of "dirty words". Similarly, there was the infamous wardrobe malfunction in which a female breast--the horror!--was exposed for the world to see during the Super Bowl--and which will forever be available on the Internet.
These exceptions, though minor, are the kind of thing that most people will tolerate, even while considering that such toleration is in no ways incompatible with the full support of liberty. The ostensible reason for such intolerance is usually "the children", but even reasonable adults without children might very well object to, say, the airing of hardcore pornography on daylight television--or on roadside billboards.
The reason for the toleration of such exceptions is, I think, twofold. First, people will argue for a mitigation of what they believe to be inessential liberties because they don't see how these violations could ever cause them to forfeit the liberties they view to be essential. Preventing Leno from dropping F-bombs is acceptable because it can in no way prevent people from discussing the candidates running for election. People will even go so far as to insist that the suspension of habeas corpus for enemy combatants in our Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism will never lead to a similar suspension of rights for citizens--despite the fact that this has happened a number of times in U.S. history.
Second, a lamentably large number of people, though convinced of the truth they possess, are less confident in the ability for others to arrive at this truth without resorting to compulsion. There are many examples of this. The terrorists do not have legitimate concerns: "they hate our freedoms". Religious people are inherently irrational; religious belief should be categorized as a mental disorder. The same can be said for liberalism--and probably conservatism. Certain faiths should be spread by the sword, rather than by reason.
The list isn't confined to any particular ideology; human intolerance knows no boundaries. And while some of the above is more rhetoric than anything else, one would could easily envisage violations of liberty which spring from these examples. Ironically enough, those who assert that those who disagree with them are irrational are almost always irrational themselves; and if lovers of liberty will not use compulsion to convince them of their errors, it must be admitted that an appeal to reason is unlikely to produce much in the way of results.
The strength of Mill's tract will, I think, depend on his ability to convince the former group of the fundamental importance of a complete commitment to liberty, since the latter seems unlikely to either read Mill, or be convinced by his efforts.
Thinking more on it, one simply objection to Mill's thesis is that is that while liberty is good and desirable, it is well nigh impossible to construct a government which does not at least occasionally and slightly infringe upon it. The central flaw, then, of this system, is that it a bit impractical. There are some ways around this, I think, and we may perhaps revisit them later; but to give but one example to illustrate this flaw, no nation can maintain a standing army without extracting revenues from its citizens to provide for its pay. We shall have to wait and see if Mill considers this criticism.
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9 comments:
Hey Eric,
Thanks for getting us started. I think this will be quite a productive exchange.
To start with your last point, taxing to maintain an army strikes me as quite a clear example of a governmental imposition that prevents harm, not only to others, but even to oneself. A country without a military is vulnerable to its neighbors in all kinds of ways, even if they don't actually march in to slaughter civilians. No?
As I see it, the main challenge Mill sets up for himself in the Introduction is to develop a sufficiently robust conception of "harm" such as to make his famous "harm principle" productive for actual cases. My Penguin Classics edition seems to be rather less scholarly than yours, as the text starts at p.55, after the editor's preface, and lacks line numbers. At any rate, I find the most direct statement of the principle at p.68:
"[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
It's compelling for its simplicity -- and it definitely captures something very important -- but is it really the one true principle by which all government action can be assessed? Is there such a principle? As I said, I think the answer will largely depend upon how broadly we are willing to construe "harm." Two of the examples you introduce are quite apt in this regard: Is anyone harmed by the presence of vulgar language or pornographic imagery in the public sphere? Some people claim to be. But then some people claim to be harmed by criticism of government, which in many cases genuinely offends a deep-seated sense of patriotism. And it's not obvious to me that there is any objective set of criteria by which we could assess the legitimacy of these various claims.
Another site of contention, which I believe is of particular importance, is the second region of liberty mentioned by Mill in the passage you cite, the liberty "of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them." It will be crucial, in my view, to be clear that it counts as doing serious harm to a person to deprive her of the resources necessary to articulate a fulfilling life plan and of fair access to the resources necessary to pursue its accomplishment. This establishes government obligations, most obviously, with regard to education and the structure of the market. Everyone is entitled to knowledge about what kinds of goods are available in the world -- what kinds of things thoughtful people have valued throughout the ages -- and of how best to pursue these goods under the current social order.
That's all for now. I'm currently mid-way through the next section, and I may also review the first to add to the comments here. Or, in any case, I'm sure we'll return to many of the claims made in the Introduction as we continue.
Best, PJ
A country without a military is vulnerable to its neighbors in all kinds of ways, even if they don't actually march in to slaughter civilians. No?
I agree completely. The issue is that maintaining such an army requires some form of revenue. The form this is likely to take is taxes, which are an infringement upon the liberty of the individual to do what he wishes with the fruits of his labor.
As I said, I think the answer will largely depend upon how broadly we are willing to construe "harm."
This is a point I glossed over a bit, so it's good you bring it up. We can take harm to be physical, but that of course means that any amount of non-physical harm must be tolerated. To take one example from American history, the egregious discrimination and intimidation of blacks--among others--was, though quite regrettable, something about which the government could do nothing.
However, if we take harm in too broad a sense, we lose a good deal of our freedoms. Political correctness, however well intentioned, has undeniably reduced the range of freedom for expression, if not thought. I too am looking forward to see how Mill defines harm.
It will be crucial, in my view, to be clear that it counts as doing serious harm to a person to deprive her of the resources necessary to articulate a fulfilling life plan and of fair access to the resources necessary to pursue its accomplishment. This establishes government obligations, most obviously, with regard to education and the structure of the market.
On this point, I would have to disagree. Libertarian Ilana Mercer summarizes the point nicely:
This writer holds that the sole role of a legitimate government is to protect only the inalienable rights to life, liberty and property, and the pursuit of happiness. Why life, liberty, and property, and not housing, food, education, health care, child benefits, emotional well-being, enriching employment, adequate vacations, ad infinitum, as promised variously by the remaining (viable) presidential contenders? Because the former impose no obligations on other free individuals; the latter enslave some in the service of others.
This is the point I was trying to make in regards to the standing army. There are any number things which we may wish the government to provide, but that it cannot so long as it refrains from impinging on the liberties of others in the process.
I'll be out of town again this weekend, but I should have no trouble finishing section two by some time next week. Feel free to continue the discussion, and also post your thoughts on section two whenever you so desire.
In case you're curious, here is the Mercer link.
With regard to the harm principle, I think it's indisputable that "harm" needs to be taken in a more expanse sense than the merely physical. I believe Mill would agree that any infringement on our liberties counts as harm in a relevant sense. For instance, don't we want the government to protect our property, even when that property is unrelated to our biological well-being?
I agree with you, though, that the broader our conception of "harm," the more individual freedoms we forfeit, and that we do not want to sacrifice any of our freedoms without very good reasons. The challenge is to figure out what counts as a good reason so that we may achieve a reasonable balance between our individual liberties and those of others around us.
Mill's harm principle is his effort to meet this challenge. If you're not satisfied with his proposal, how would you modify the principle, or what other elements would you put into play to amend the perceived weaknesses of his theory? Ilana Mercer's libertarian objection that governments cannot legitimately impose any obligations on free individuals strikes me a non-starter, a proposal predicated on an unrealistically utopian idea of the socio-political world and an implausibly atomistic conception of the individual. You've effectively conceded that in some cases -- such as the need for a standing army -- the government is justified in taxation. So the question is, how do we decide which cases are justified and which are not?
Cheers,
PJ
For instance, don't we want the government to protect our property, even when that property is unrelated to our biological well-being?
Offhand, I would say the argument would be that property, like liberty, is a natural right. The government cannot guarantee our right to property; it can only avoid infringing upon it and provide some means of recourse in case our rights are violated.
You've effectively conceded that in some cases -- such as the need for a standing army -- the government is justified in taxation. So the question is, how do we decide which cases are justified and which are not?
The essential problem with libertarianism is that it is unreasonably idyllic. However, the libertarian impetus to keep government small is a good one, and if it fails to be a complete political philosophy--well, don't they all?
One way to get around this is to reverse the principle of "no taxation without representation". In other words, those who would consent to be taxed would receive a say in the government. Such a measure is dependent on the consent of the people, but so too is all good government.
In short, while I recognize that Ilana's statement is imperfect, I'm not entirely ready to concede it entirely. It seems to offer a solid starting point. Further, I cannot object to it without seeming to violate important principles. It would seem my republic would be without a standing army...
Eric: Offhand, I would say the argument would be that property, like liberty, is a natural right. The government cannot guarantee our right to property; it can only avoid infringing upon it and provide some means of recourse in case our rights are violated.
PJ: I don't see how the argument is supposed to go. And what does the descriptor "natural" give us? Property, in any case, is a social institution, not a natural fact. Furthermore, according to Mill, property is part of liberty, just like the right to articulate and pursue one's own vision of one's life, on which I base the argument for government involvement that you are here rejecting.
Eric: The essential problem with libertarianism is that it is unreasonably idyllic.
PJ: Political theory, in my opinion, should always evince a bit of utopianism. Much of what politics is about, after all, is improving our lot in the world, and this requires a good imagination and a bit of optimism. But your basic concepts have got to be adequate to the reality they're supposed to represent, or else all of your arguments are going to be hopelessly unsound. This isn't something you can just shrug off.
Eric: However, the libertarian impetus to keep government small is a good one, and if it fails to be a complete political philosophy--well, don't they all?
PJ: The first point isn't obvious; in fact, I think it's false. But unless you can connect the claim to Mill, I'd prefer not to debate it right now. To the second point, completeness is not the issue: what is important is to be *correct* in whatever claims you do make, however partial or qualified they may be.
Eric: One way to get around this is to reverse the principle of "no taxation without representation". In other words, those who would consent to be taxed would receive a say in the government. Such a measure is dependent on the consent of the people, but so too is all good government.
PJ: You want to award the most irresponsible members of the majority with a complete tax write-off? While they continue to enjoy all the services of a functional government? You can't be serious.
Eric: In short, while I recognize that Ilana's statement is imperfect, I'm not entirely ready to concede it entirely. It seems to offer a solid starting point. Further, I cannot object to it without seeming to violate important principles. It would seem my republic would be without a standing army...
PJ: And highways, and law-enforcement, and justice, and certified food and drugs, and stable financial markets, and fair markets of other kinds... safety... happiness...
And what does the descriptor "natural" give us?
There is a long tradition of natural rights in Judeo-Christianity. Property is one of those rights.
Furthermore, according to Mill, property is part of liberty, just like the right to articulate and pursue one's own vision of one's life, on which I base the argument for government involvement that you are here rejecting.
Your insistence that the public take on some role in funding education cannot be consistent with Mill's claims for liberty, per Mercer's point. If we are going to allow government to intervene, it must do so without interfering in the liberty of others; alternatively, we may reject Mill's claim.
The first point isn't obvious; in fact, I think it's false. But unless you can connect the claim to Mill, I'd prefer not to debate it right now.
A government that respects liberty will be narrow in its scope. That which was formed under The Articles of Liberation was libertarian, but it was also impotent to the point of futility. Ours today provides a number of goods and services to the public, but as it has done so, it has grown in scope and thus infringed more and more upon liberty.
You want to award the most irresponsible members of the majority with a complete tax write-off? While they continue to enjoy all the services of a functional government? You can't be serious.
But I am serious. Mill concedes that while many will agree with his theory, in practice, everyone clamors for safety and services at the expense of liberty. One possible way to get around this is to ensure that those who would dole out from the treasury would partake in first filling its coffers.
You assume that we would be left with a government that gives generously for the vaguest of reasons, as we have today. On the contrary, it is far more likely that those who hold the purse strings would be unlikely to give away money if they did not need to appease the rabble to win their votes. Certain services--such as national defense--would benefit all, irrespective of the responsibility of the various individuals, but should not those with the most to lose be the foremost champions of the country?
A similar system worked reasonably well for both Rome and Greece, at least for a time, so it is not wholly ridiculous to consider revisiting it.
And highways, and law-enforcement, and justice, and certified food and drugs, and stable financial markets, and fair markets of other kinds... safety... happiness...
Most of these could be provided by private individuals, at least theoretically. Almost always, the public ends up shelling out money to pay for services from which, it must be admitted, it draws a certain satisfaction, but which nonetheless require the reverse of liberty, namely compulsion--for that is what taxes are.
But perhaps I have erred. Do you consider taxes to be an affront to liberty?
Eric: There is a long tradition of natural rights in Judeo-Christianity. Property is one of those rights.
PJ: Well, sure. But, by your own political principles (or mine, or Mill's), you're not entitled to invoke sectarian, religious principles as the foundation of your government. If you want to continue to employ the notion of "natural rights," you need to provide a principled derivation of said rights. Otherwise you remain fatally vulnerable to the charge of arbitrary dogmatism, of unprincipled appeal to partisan authority.
Eric: Your insistence that the public take on some role in funding education cannot be consistent with Mill's claims for liberty, per Mercer's point. If we are going to allow government to intervene, it must do so without interfering in the liberty of others; alternatively, we may reject Mill's claim.
PJ: You are too quickly assimilating Mill's position into your own. The government, according to Mill, *is* allowed to impose obligations upon its citizenry when these impositions protect people from harm. Lack of education or access to markets, I contend, is a grievous harm: a curtailing of liberty itself, per Mill's definition.
Eric: But perhaps I have erred. Do you consider taxes to be an affront to liberty?
PJ: Not in principle, no. So long as taxes are levied and the revenues spent according to fair and legitimate democratic procedures, I would argue that they can be a powerful vehicle of liberation. There are many things that a centralized body can achieve to improve the lot of everyone that individuals cannot accomplish by themselves (a point that has been usefully articulated in rudimentary, game-theoretic terms).
I hope you'll excuse me for setting aside discussion of your tax proposal, for at least the time being, in order to focus on more fundamental issues. I very much look forward to your considered response to my challenges above.
Expect some notes on "The Liberty of Thought and Discussion" later today or tomorrow.
Cheers, PJ
I hope you'll excuse me for setting aside discussion of your tax proposal, for at least the time being, in order to focus on more fundamental issues. I very much look forward to your considered response to my challenges above.
Agreed. If it comes up later, so be it.
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