Locke shares many assumptions with Hobbes, yet was obviously alarmed by his absolutist conclusions. Our selection opens with restatement of a distinction dating back to Aristotle (itself, perhaps, an implicit response to Plato's absolutism). The distinction is between the political and the private, between the polis and the oikos (household). In familial and economic relations, one party may rule another absolutely, as, for instance, parents over young children. (The examples Aristotle and Locke actually give make this way of drawing the distinction appear rather contentious, e.g., master over slave, husband over wife...) Political power, in any case, refers to a different kind of relationship. His definition: "a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in execution of such laws, and in defense of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good" (243). He will proceed to argue, however, that this power is always conditional on the government acting according to the trust with which the people endow it (e.g. 275). Indeed, there is a passage at p.250 in which he cleverly turns Hobbes' own assumptions against him. Beginning, as Hobbes does, from the conviction that our passion for self-preservation is the most powerful motivating force in our lives, it is manifestly irrational to place oneself unconditionally under the authority of a potentially arbitrary sovereign.
Like Hobbes, Locke grounds his political theory by appeal to a state of nature. Yet he paints a decidedly rosier picture of this state. We are all equal, he says, not in our ability each to kill the other, but in the free use of the same set of human faculties. He appeals here to the religious conviction that God put us here to prosper, and we ought not to interfere with his intention (244-5). There are also operative assumptions of natural abundance and sociability. The natural law that follows from this description is that "being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions" (244). Furthermore, in the state of nature, everyone has the right to enforce this law, punishing offenses proportionally to the degree of transgression (245). He introduces civil government as the proper remedy for the "inconveniences" that arise from the difficulties of judging cases in which we are a party (246). I don't have an OED to-hand, but, compared with what we saw in Hobbes, the language of "inconveniences" is to me strikingly mild (though Locke does acknowledge that this inconvenience might result in quite a bit of violence at p.249).
There is unfortunately little argument in these opening passages to persuade us to accept this picture rather than that of Hobbes. How does he respond to the charge that we are, by natural disposition, inclined toward quarrel, that our interest in gain, safety, and reputation set us continually at odds with one another (Hobbes 208)? I believe that it is Locke's discussion of property that is supposed to help make his view plausible to us.
I am going to stop here for the moment. Perhaps you want to cover his view on property? Or just respond to whatever struck you in the text or the above. I will try to be better about keeping up with this...
Cheers, PJ
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Good start. I'll try to put something together later. In the meantime...
Locke shares many assumptions with Hobbes, yet was obviously alarmed by his absolutist conclusions.
This is correct, but there are some pretty big differences, too.
One such difference is the state of nature. For Locke, according to Frederick Copleston: "Force, exercised without right, creates a state of war; but this is not to be identified with a state of nature, since it constitutes a violation of the state of nature; that is, of what ought to be." (A History of Philosophy, Vol. V, p. 128)
Another was that he believed in the natural law. It's true that Hobbes speaks of laws of nature, but Locke believed that there was a moral law, available to man by virtue of his reason, and binding on him. It follows then that it is no longer necessary for the sovereign to prevent the state of war; man may prevent it if he abides by the natural law.
Another point that follows from Locke's state of nature is that punishment isn't the exclusive duty of the sovereign. Indeed, "every one has a right to punish the transgressors if that law [of nature] to such a degree, as may hinder its violation." (Princeton Readings p. 244) Locke more or less rephrases this thought in this and the subsequent paragraph.
How does he respond to the charge that we are, by natural disposition, inclined toward quarrel, that our interest in gain, safety, and reputation set us continually at odds with one another (Hobbes 208)?
Locke offers a rejoinder, seemingly to Hobbes: "absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be remedy for those evils, which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases... I desire to know, what kind of government that is... where one man...has the liberty to be judge in his own case... much better is it in the state of nature [i.e. Locke's], wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind." (pp. 246-7)
If Hobbes is rightly concerned about the mischievous of men, he shows too little concern for the same in his monarch.
Locke was very prescient. It wasn't until the twentieth century that we saw the disastrous consequences of absolute power in the hands of one man, such as Stalin. This is not to say that Hobbes was a Stalinist, only that this emphasis on monarchical absolutism is given a much needed correction by Locke in the passage quoted above.
Eric: For Locke, according to Frederick Copleston: "Force, exercised without right, creates a state of war; but this is not to be identified with a state of nature, since it constitutes a violation of the state of nature; that is, of what ought to be." (A History of Philosophy, Vol. V, p. 128)
PJ: Locke explicitly rejects Hobbes' equation of the state of nature with a state of war. So Copleston is clearly right in the first part of the remark you quote; however, I think he goes too far in the second part. Although Locke does claim that the state of nature includes a normative structure of natural rights, he does not identify the state of nature with that structure, and he does not propose the state of nature as a political ideal. His preference is for what he calls a "political, or civil society," which he defines as a society in which men have ceded "executive power" of natural law to the public (259). This requires and is legitimized by individual consent, but that consent is tacitly given by anyone that "hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government" (261). What motivates us to institute a government to arbitrate our disputes is the uncertainty of our natural rights in the state of nature (262). So again, Locke's position is very much like Hobbes', even if he proposes a different form of government to protect our rights and adjudicate disputes.
Eric: Another was that he believed in the natural law. It's true that Hobbes speaks of laws of nature, but Locke believed that there was a moral law, available to man by virtue of his reason, and binding on him. It follows then that it is no longer necessary for the sovereign to prevent the state of war; man may prevent it if he abides by the natural law.
PJ: Locke does have a wider notion of natural law than Hobbesian self-preservation. But does he offer any arguments to defend it? Hobbes works at a psychological level: this is how people are, he says, and any functional government has got to accommodate the driving passions that rule their behavior. Locke seems to appeal to a sectarian religious doctrine (e.g. 244).
Eric: Another point that follows from Locke's state of nature is that punishment isn't the exclusive duty of the sovereign. Indeed, "every one has a right to punish the transgressors if that law [of nature] to such a degree, as may hinder its violation." (Princeton Readings p. 244) Locke more or less rephrases this thought in this and the subsequent paragraph.
PJ: Not quite. Men in the state of nature do have executive power. But as soon as there is a government, they have relinquished this power and are no longer in the state of nature (263).
Locke seems to appeal to a sectarian religious doctrine (e.g. 244).
Since the natural law has usually been defended by religious individuals, there is a tendency to equate the two. This is unfortunate, as natural law provides an ethical framework for irreligious people. Contrary to Dostoevsky's famous statement that without God, all is permissible, natural law theorists believe that reason alone provides common ground for ethics, irrespective of religious belief. This is secondary to the discussion on Locke, but it's an important point.
Men in the state of nature do have executive power. But as soon as there is a government, they have relinquished this power and are no longer in the state of nature (263).
You're correct. I only wanted to emphasize that, for Locke, civilization is at least possible without the State. For Hobbes, it is essential. This is a substantial distinction.
Locke seems to appeal to a sectarian religious doctrine (e.g. 244).
Since the natural law has usually been defended by religious individuals, there is a tendency to equate the two. This is unfortunate, as natural law provides an ethical framework for irreligious people. Contrary to Dostoevsky's famous statement that without God, all is permissible, natural law theorists believe that reason alone provides common ground for ethics, irrespective of religious belief. This is secondary to the discussion on Locke, but it's an important point.
Men in the state of nature do have executive power. But as soon as there is a government, they have relinquished this power and are no longer in the state of nature (263).
You're correct. I only wanted to emphasize that, for Locke, civilization is at least possible without the State. For Hobbes, it is essential. This is a substantial distinction.
Eric: Since the natural law has usually been defended by religious individuals, there is a tendency to equate the two. This is unfortunate, as natural law provides an ethical framework for irreligious people. Contrary to Dostoevsky's famous statement that without God, all is permissible, natural law theorists believe that reason alone provides common ground for ethics, irrespective of religious belief. This is secondary to the discussion on Locke, but it's an important point.
PJ: The problem is not so much that it is religious (it comes from the Stoics, after all) as it is that it is dogmatic. Why believe that there are natural laws? How do we know what they are? Locke says that natural law requires us to respect one another's property. But his immediate defense of this claim seems to be nothing more than a vague appeal to "reason" (244). The form of the argument looks dangerously close to "anyone who doesn't agree with my basic moral commitments is irrational, and so disqualified from debate." I'm not saying he can't defend his claims (we may find that he does), but the mere appeal to reason gets us nowhere.
Why believe that there are natural laws? How do we know what they are? Locke says that natural law requires us to respect one another's property. But his immediate defense of this claim seems to be nothing more than a vague appeal to "reason" (244).
Since the natural law is my firmest hope that the irreligious and the religious can find a common ethic, I'm disappointed that you don't find it impressive.
The clearest component of the natural law, to my mind anyway, is that which asserts the right to life. Since we cannot argue that life is not a good without falling into hopeless contradiction--man should off himself to improve himself, only then there is no one left to improve--we believe it to be a right.
The proof for the right to property runs along similar lines, though in some traditions it is conditional and subservient to the right to life. Property is certainly a prerequisite for the capital accumulation that made civilization possible. Whether or not the proof is rigorous, it's apparent to me that common sense alone leads us to defend property in some fashion.
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