Saturday, July 18, 2009

Plato's Republic, Book V

Socrates proposes to expand on four types of vice as they are found in political constitutions, but is immediately interrupted by Polemarchus and Adeimantus, who want him to explain his earlier claim that wives and children should be held in common. They want to know why this arrangement should be considered ideal, and also whether it could ever actually be realized in practice, which emerges as a more general issue for the project as a whole. A lot of the discussion in this chapter is concerned with the philosophically uninteresting logistics of this communal arrangement. I'll report on selective remarks, but try to focus on the more provocative or conceptually substantive claims.

The reason for keeping children and wives in common, already provided in earlier books, is to prevent any particular attachments from conflicting with the devotion of the guardians to the city as a whole. There is a particularly strong statement of the ideal at 462a-b: "Is there any greater evil we can mention for a city than that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?" "There isn't." Indeed, it seems Plato/Soc would prefer for the city to be united in pain than for just some of its members to be happy. With their biological parentage obscured, the guardians effectively become one big family, and they will be encouraged to observe proper familial devotion. Everyone is to assess their lot with reference, not only to the same shared set of objects, but with reference to the same family, the same "mine" in all possible respects (462c).

In a passage that has been the source of much subsequent criticism, Plato/Soc makes an analogy between his proposed methods for ensuring the reproduction of the citizenry and the mating and breeding of animals. Just as we breed from only the best of our animals, so too should we maximize the number of offspring produced by our fittest citizens (459). The worst citizens should be prevented, as much as possible, from reproducing. Plato/Soc suggests phony lotteries, among other ploys, to ensure optimal pairings. Children of "inferior" parents -- along with any other children found to be defective -- will be secretly left to the elements (460c). Yikes!

I've protested against Plato/Soc's assumption of fixed "natures" determinable in every individual. He expands here on this claim and some of its implications. We are to determine the relevant dimension of a child's nature by observing what sort of activities it learns with the most ease (455b). My skepticism is not entirely dispelled, but this does sound rather more innocent than I originally (rather uncharitably) took it to be. It follows from this that many natural differences are politically irrelevant. Women, for instance, are eligible for all of the positions traditionally reserved for men (and so I should probably be more careful with my pronouns).

Stepping back for a moment, I wonder how much Plato/Soc's tremendous confidence in education and the powers of reason might conflict with his doctrine of individual nature. To the objection that women training naked with men would cause problems, Plato/Soc responds that this is the rational way to do things, and so people will learn to regard it as the norm. (These women will "wear virtue or excellence instead of clothes" (457a).) How is it that we can educate everyone into these supposedly more enlightened sexual and familial norms -- reprograming the psyche at quite a deep level -- but that many people are constitutionally unsuited for higher learning? There is no outright contradiction in the text, but I think there is some potential tension between the views.

Anyhow, changing topics, I should at least call attention to the remarks on inter-polis relations, since this is something that came up earlier. Plato/Soc's view is that war with other Greeks should be treated as a form of civil war, in which the participants should never do anything to foreclose future reconciliation. There are fewer restrictions, by contrast, in a war against barbarians, with whom no political, cultural, or economic relations are desired. This strikes me as a sensible position, allowing for the obvious limitations of a worldview in which only Greeks count as full people.

Shifting into the last movement of this book, Socrates is called back to task on one of the original challenges presented in its opening pages: "whether its possible for this constitution to come into being and in what way it could be brought about" (471c). A mighty challenge indeed, and his response is characteristically indirect. It's also hedged with a considerable qualification (a consequence, in this case, of the ontology he will proceed to expound?), that we must be satisfied with practical approximations of the truths we articulate in theory (473a).

The key to the implementation of this ideal, simply put, is to get a philosopher in charge: "Until philosophers rule as kings in cities or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils[...], nor, I think, will the human race" (473c-d). Furthermore, those not suited to do philosophy and rule are "naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and follow their leader" (474b-c). Authoritarian? Just a little? A great deal of apologetic rhetoric surrounds these pronouncement, anticipating and attempting to forfend our skepticism.

Plato/Soc defines the philosopher as one who desires the whole of wisdom and loves the sight of truth (475). The intended contrast here is with our mundane experience of the appearances of things. We want knowledge itself, not just acquaintance with images. We must distinguish, for instance, between beautiful items or varieties of beautiful features and the beautiful itself. Only acquaintance with the latter can supply us with the sort of authentic truth that is the mark of philosophy. Knowledge is specified to be of what is, which Plato/Soc seems to assume to be eternally stable and immutable. Ignorance, its opposite, ranges over what lacks being. Between these extremes lies opinion. Unlike knowledge, opinion is fallible, and this is to say that it must have a different object than knowledge. This object, intermediate between being and non-being, is appearance. Appearances have multiple, contradictory aspects, and our opinions about them are subject to various, arbitrary conventions (479). So most of us, Plato/Soc is claiming, live entirely in this realm of appearance and have only opinions, no real knowledge. Strong claims, on which more to follow in subsequent books.

These definitions established, the argument will continue in Book VI.


I see your response on the last post, and will reply soon.

Cheers,
PJ

4 comments:

A Wiser Man Than I said...

Indeed, it seems Plato/Soc would prefer for the city to be united in pain than for just some of its members to be happy.

Unification in pain seldom works unless there is something external upon which the pain can be blamed. One reason Hitler was so popular in post-WWI Germany was that he could unite his people over the injustice of the Versailles Treaty. If Socrates wants his citizens to tolerate the sharing of wives and children, methinks he'll need a very good "noble lie".

Children of "inferior" parents -- along with any other children found to be defective -- will be secretly left to the elements (460c). Yikes!

Yikes, indeed. But remember, this sort of thing did happen in certain Greek cities, Sparta most famously. And the eugenics movement is not so dead as we might wish. Less than a century ago, people like Margaret Sanger attempted to discourage unwanted peoples--blacks, etc.--from reproducing.

How is it that we can educate everyone into these supposedly more enlightened sexual and familial norms -- reprograming the psyche at quite a deep level -- but that many people are constitutionally unsuited for higher learning?

Or how is it that men and women will be able to work out next to each other naked without reducing the efficacy of the exercise, but Socrates has no faith in combating lust, even among his guardians? Socrates was well known to have a very stoic nature, so I think he has a tendency to forget that people aren't necessarily as strong-willed as he is; but also that some measure of control and self-improvement is not beyond the reach of any of us.

This strikes me as a sensible position, allowing for the obvious limitations of a worldview in which only Greeks count as full people.

It's consistent with the way things were viewed at the time. Of more concern to me is that he simply assumes that war is morally acceptable. Certainly, we can justify defensive wars, and some aggressive wars may even be morally defensible, but I would have liked to see him at least examine the point rather than simply assume that his city will go to war now and again.

The key to the implementation of this ideal, simply put, is to get a philosopher in charge...

I understand his argument, and am somewhat receptive to it, but I wonder if what has occurred in history since Plato wrote would cause him to change his mind.

For instance, was Marcus Aurelius, a true philosopher king, a good ruler? (I would say that he was.) What about Frederick the Great of Prussia? (I would say no; although he was tolerant of the philosophes of the Enlightenment, and famously corresponded with Voltaire, he was too ready to wage war.) Or Napolean? (Again, no; he was far too much a warmonger.)

Also, can you see people going in for the wives and children in common? It strikes me as incredible. (And, in fact, the many socialist experiments of the Middle Ages attest to its impossibility: in practice, the leader(s) were able to sleep with whomever they wished, but the scheme always broke down.)

Another query: can you see people believing the lottery was unfixed when the good and the beautiful continue to prosper while those of lesser natures never manage to win? Unless the latter are wholly ignorant of probability and lacking in common sense, this noble lie will have to be revised.

Good summary. I'm on vacation this week, but this actually means I'll be away from the computer. I'll check back when I can.

PJ said...

Eric: Of more concern to me is that he simply assumes that war is morally acceptable. Certainly, we can justify defensive wars, and some aggressive wars may even be morally defensible, but I would have liked to see him at least examine the point rather than simply assume that his city will go to war now and again.

PJ: There is certainly a lot to be said about the morality of war. As a practical matter, however, I feel it's a fair assumption: rulers must at least be prepared to defend their city from intruders. Yet considering that we're deliberatively constructing an *ideal,* it might have been interesting for Plato/Soc to justify the scope of his argument. Why a just city rather a just world-order? Was the latter simply unimaginable?

Eric: I understand his argument, and am somewhat receptive to it, but I wonder if what has occurred in history since Plato wrote would cause him to change his mind. For instance, was Marcus Aurelius, a true philosopher king, a good ruler? (I would say that he was.) What about Frederick the Great of Prussia? (I would say no; although he was tolerant of the philosophes of the Enlightenment, and famously corresponded with Voltaire, he was too ready to wage war.) Or Napolean? (Again, no; he was far too much a warmonger.)

PJ: I don't know enough about these men to give an informed opinion. It would be quite a bit of work to determine the extent to which Plato's technical definition of "philosopher" applies to these historical rulers.

Eric: Also, can you see people going in for the wives and children in common? It strikes me as incredible. (And, in fact, the many socialist experiments of the Middle Ages attest to its impossibility)

PJ: Psychologically implausible, absolutely. One small point that helps (a little): I think the wives-in-common arrangement is limited to the guardians.

Eric: can you see people believing the lottery was unfixed when the good and the beautiful continue to prosper while those of lesser natures never manage to win? Unless the latter are wholly ignorant of probability and lacking in common sense, this noble lie will have to be revised.

PJ: How many people class themselves among the stupid, ugly, and vicious? I think with careful management and the various other techniques described that this could be moderately successful--once people are sold on the communal living arrangement, that is.

Eric: I'm on vacation this week, but this actually means I'll be away from the computer. I'll check back when I can.

PJ: It was good to see you! I'm back in NY now and have read Book VI. I'll try to respond on it today or tomorrow. Book VII will likely have to wait until this weekend.

Cheers, PJ

A Wiser Man Than I said...

Was the latter simply unimaginable?

I think so. Then again, after Plato and Aristotle came Alexander, who did try to conquer the world. I'm not sure he groked the whole philosopher-king concept, though.

It would be quite a bit of work to determine the extent to which Plato's technical definition of "philosopher" applies to these historical rulers.

We should take Socrates at his word, but it helps to look at the centuries of history which have elapsed since the Republic was written to see if Plato's wisdom still holds on particular points.

Marcus Aurelius is the quintessential philosopher king. I don't think many people have too much to say against him, though it is unfortunate that he persecuted the Christians.

Perhaps we could read a bit of history at a future date. Napoleon claimed that it was the only true philosophy.

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Socrates was the best, I've been reading each book about him , and I think my life is changing about it, also I agree with that about, "the worst citizens should be prevented", its a great policy.